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MONUMENTS OF FOLLY: HOW LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS CAN CHALLENGE CONFEDERATE
“STATUE STATUTES”
Zachary Bray*
ABSTRACT
Monuments to the Confederacy and former Confederate figures have been
prominently displayed in parks, courthouse squares, and other public spaces of
many American towns and cities for many years. Their history is inextricably
linked with patterns of institutionalized racism, including but not limited to the rise
of Jim Crow and resistance to the integration of public schools. In recent years, the
continued display of these monuments has given rise to intense controversy and
outbreaks of violence. In response, some local governments have sought to remove
or modify Confederate monuments in public spaces, but in several states, local
governments face statutory restraints on removing or modifying these monuments.
More specifically, some local governments must reckon with statutes designed to
preserve the public display of these monuments in places of honor and respect.
These “statue statutes” are frequently described as “impossible” barriers for local
governments that wish to modify or remove Confederate monuments.
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Joseph Singer for their helpful comments and suggestions regarding the ideas and arguments
expressed here and in earlier drafts. All remaining errors are my own.

1

2

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about the statue statutes is
wrong. Contrary to their reputation, these statutes are so poorly drafted that many
local governments could remove or modify Confederate monuments in public
spaces, should they wish to do so. Although the statue statutes will prove less
effective than many have supposed, it would be best to get rid of them altogether.
This Article begins by explaining why this should be done: it reviews the myriad
arguments in favor of repealing the statue statutes or striking them down as
unconstitutional. But the process of rooting out the statue statutes altogether will
take time—perhaps a great deal of time—and the prospects of success, at least in
the short term, are uncertain at best.
In the meantime, local governments that wish to tear down Confederate
monuments must figure out how to do so within the statutes’ constraints. This
Article explains how this can be done: it shows that the protections that the statue
statutes ostensibly afford Confederate monuments in public spaces are far weaker
than many suppose. As this Article shows, local governments in many jurisdictions
with statue statutes have far more freedom to move, modify, or get rid of
Confederate monuments in public spaces than many have supposed. This Article
concludes by explaining why arguments for the present frailty of many statue
statutes complement arguments for their abolition. Those who wish to get rid of
statue statutes and move, modify, or get rid of the monuments the statutes protect
should take what actions they can under the existing statutes even as they work to
get rid of the statutes altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, a Confederate monument dedicated to the “rank
and file of the Armies of the South” stood in Louisville, Kentucky.1 Over seventy
feet tall and weighing over one hundred tons, the imposing monument was built
with private funds in 18952—three decades after the end of the Civil War, three
years after Kentucky enacted a separate coach law that brought Kentucky’s Jim
Crow regime in line with other southern states,3 and one year before the
Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson.4 The monument was originally
placed in front of a reform school on the city’s outskirts, where it remained for
its first six decades of existence.5
In 1954, the year that the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education,6 the monument was moved to a more central location, nearly
adjacent to the University of Louisville.7 There it remained for several more
decades.8 In April 2016, just over ten months after a white supremacist and
Confederate memorabilia enthusiast committed the Charleston church
massacre,9 Louisville’s mayor and the university’s president announced plans to

1. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div. v. Louisville Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, No. 16-CI2009, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2016).
2. Chico Harlan, A 121-Year-Old Confederate Monument Was Coming Down. This Kentucky
Town Put It Back Up., WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-121year-old-confederate-monument-was-coming-down-this-kentucky-town-put-it-back-up/2017/08/20/7a3
97fc6-85b0-11e7-a50f-e0d4e6ec070a_story.html [http://perma.cc/YU4P-F46U].
3. Anne E. Marshall, Kentucky’s Separate Coach Law and African American Response, 1892–
1900, 98 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 241, 241–42 (2000).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1.
8. Id.
9. In June 2015 nine people were killed during evening Bible study at the Emanuel African
Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, by a gunman who repeatedly expressed
enthusiasm for Confederate memorabilia on social media. Nick Corasaniti et al., Church Massacre
Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1MNwpAr
[http://perma.cc/YWP4-279Y]. The Charleston massacre sparked a near-immediate backlash against
the continued display of Confederate images in public places in South Carolina and elsewhere,
followed by a groundswell of reactive support for Confederate images in public places. Compare, e.g.,
Ben Brumfield & Catherine E. Shoichet, Protesters To Chant ‘Take It Down’ as S.C. Legislators Meet
over Flag, CNN (June 23, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/23/us/charleston-churchshooting-main/index.html [http://perma.cc/HP4N-M4UT] (“[L]ess than a week after the massacre of
innocents in a Charleston church by a man who venerates the [Confederate] flag, voices from all parts
of the political spectrum are rising . . . to say the flag must no longer fly over public buildings.”), with,
e.g., Mason Adams, How the Rebel Flag Rose Again—And Is Helping Trump, POLITICO (June 16,
2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-south-confederate-flagracism-charleston-shooting-213954 [http://perma.cc/F4LH-RHJ5] (noting that over 360 Confederate
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relocate the monument to an unspecified alternative location.10 According to
Louisville’s mayor, moving the monument had become necessary because it no
longer had a “place in a compassionate, forward leaning city.”11
In May 2016, concerned that the monument would be moved to a less
prominent site or destroyed, the Kentucky Division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans filed suit to stop its removal.12 The plaintiffs based their arguments, in
part,13 on a Kentucky statute that prohibits the alteration, destruction, or
removal of “military heritage site[s],”14 which expressly include monuments to
“activities engaged in by the Confederate States of America.”15 Although the
court granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order, it ultimately concluded
that the statute did not protect the monument from removal.16 In June 2016 the
court granted the City of Louisville’s motion to dismiss the suit.17 The monument
was moved to neighboring Brandenburg, a small town in a nearby county that
periodically hosts Civil War reenactments of a Confederate general’s raids across
the Ohio River.18 Brandenburg’s elected officials were eager to take the
monument, as were many (but not all) of Brandenburg’s residents.19 At the
monument’s festive rededication ceremony in its new home, hundreds of happy
local citizens and monument supporters outnumbered roughly a dozen
protesters.20
The story of this monument—once Louisville’s and now Brandenburg’s—is
typical, in many ways, of the history of and recent conflicts over Confederate
monuments in this country. Like the Louisville monument, in recent years many
monuments to the Confederacy or famous Confederates have been altered or
removed from public places where they once stood in former Confederate
states,21 former border states,22 and states with little apparent connection to the

flag rallies occurred around the South in the six months after the Charleston shooting).
10. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 1. The University of Louisville was
involved because of its proximity to the monument and because it planned to cover the cost of the
monument’s removal with private funds given to a university foundation. Id. at 2.
11. Harlan, supra note 2.
12. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 2.
13. Id. at 5.
14. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.788(1) (West 2018).
15. Id. § 171.780(2).
16. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 7.
17. Id. at 2, 7–8.
18. Meade County Civil War Heritage Ass’n, BRANDENBURG CIVIL WAR REENACTMENT,
http://www.brandenburgreenactment.com/ [http://perma.cc/ZHM2-W9S4] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
19. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Confederate Monument, Shunned by One Kentucky City, Is
Welcomed in Another, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2siFRHU [http://perma.cc/3WMM6AJK].
20. Harlan, supra note 2.
21. E.g., Christopher Mele, New Orleans Begins Removing Confederate Monuments, Under
Police Guard, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2pdsxqd [http://perma.cc/3ZZH-39QW].
22. E.g., Toriano Porter & Joe Robertson, Vandalized Confederate Monument in KC Is Boxed
Up Ahead of Removal, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 20, 2017, 5:23 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/
local/article168249392.html [http://perma.cc/WK6G-V4WF].

2018]

MONUMENTS OF FOLLY

5

Confederacy.23 Some of these removals occurred after significant and prolonged
debate that attracted national attention,24 while other monuments were bundled
away quickly and quietly with relatively little conflict over their removal or
ultimate destination.25 But like the Brandenburg monument, many other
monuments to the Confederacy or famous Confederates remain in public places,
even when they have provided a focus for tragic violence that has transfixed the
country.26
Despite this legacy of institutionalized discrimination and violence, support
for retaining Confederate monuments in public spaces remains high, especially in
those states where the bulk of the monuments are located.27 In many recent
regional and national polls, at least a plurality of respondents favor preserving
Confederate monuments in public spaces,28 although in some areas local
majorities are strongly against Confederate monument preservation.29 More
specifically, in university towns and relatively large and diverse urban areas, such
as Louisville, opposition to Confederate monuments tends to be relatively
strong, and local officials are often willing to take action to remove or alter

23. See, e.g., Angela Brandt, City of Helena To Remove Confederate Fountain, HELENA INDEP.
REC. (Aug. 16, 2017), http://helenair.com/news/local/city-of-helena-to-remove-confederatefountain/article_606b058a-4e09-5802-a7b8-dc07f2b0a27e.html [http://perma.cc/88ME-Q9AD].
24. See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Battle over Confederate Monuments in New Orleans, NEW
YORKER
(May
12,
2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-battle-overconfederate-monuments-in-new-orleans [http://perma.cc/925E-UGG8].
25. See, e.g., Colin Campbell & Luke Broadwater, Citing ‘Safety and Security,’ Pugh Has
Baltimore Confederate Monuments Taken Down, BALT. SUN (Aug. 16, 2017, 5:20 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-monuments-removed-20170816story.html [http://perma.cc/B9TB-6ZPF] (“We moved quickly and quietly . . . . There was enough
grandstanding, enough speeches being made.” (quoting Baltimore Mayor Catherine Pugh)).
26. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Charlottesville Judge Orders Shrouds Removed from Confederate
Statues, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/charlottesvillejudge-orders-shrouds-removed-from-confederate-statues/2018/02/27/3592ae10-1bf6-11e8-9de1-147dd
2df3829_story.html [http://perma.cc/Z8GE-V76B].
27. E.g., Early Exit Polls: Virginia Voters Favor Keeping Confederate Monuments, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-early-exit-polls-virginia-voters-favorkeeping-confederate-n818641 [http://perma.cc/PDP5-HGM2]; Alex Seitz-Wald, NBC News Poll: The
South, Once a Conservative Bastion, Is Changing, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018, 2:39 AM), http://www
.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/nbc-news-poll-south-once-conservative-bastion-changing-n864441
[http://perma.cc/F7MN-U9VR] (“[A] strong majority of Southerners—61 percent—oppose removing
Confederate monuments and statues from public spaces, while just 36 percent support their
removal.”).
28. E.g., Chris Kahn, A Majority of Americans Want To Preserve Confederate Monuments:
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2017, 5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-protestspoll/a-majority-of-americans-want-to-preserve-confederate-monuments-reuters-ipsos-poll-idU
SKCN1B12EG [http://perma.cc/CE4Z-CZFZ].
29. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, After Charlottesville, Va. Democrats See Chance To Change 114Year-Old Monuments Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcpolitics/after-charlottesville-va-democrats-see-opening-to-change-114-year-old-monuments-law/2017/
08/25/5e97e766-880e-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html [http://perma.cc/EAR3-SKFM] (noting that
in Virginia most cities are relatively diverse and liberal politically, while the populations of rural and
exurban areas, and the state government as a whole, tend to be more conservative and solicitous of the
state’s Confederate past).
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them.30 On the other hand, in rural, exurban, and some suburban areas, such as
Brandenburg, support for Confederate monuments tends to be relatively high,
both among the general public and local officials.31
This pronounced split in opinions on Confederate monuments can be
understood, in part, as an example of a wider and widening rural-urban divide.
This rural-urban split is partly cultural, as Americans on either side of it
increasingly feel estranged from their fellow citizens.32 But it is also structural,
because local governments are and historically have been systematically
disadvantaged by the American federal framework.33
In the case of debates over Confederate monuments in public places, it is
easy for the cultural and structural issues behind the wider rural-urban divide to
boil over, because the resolution of these debates often appears to be
particularly arbitrary for the losing side.34 In general, those who disagree with
preservation decisions often find them to be arbitrary because the preservation
of physical objects and spaces frequently depends on relatively open-ended and
elastic values.35 Preservation decisions in prominent public spaces are even more
likely to be arbitrary when, as with the preservation of Confederate monuments,
they relate to historical narratives that marginalize minority communities.36

30. See, e.g., Mitch Landrieu, Mayor, New Orleans, Address at Gallier Hall (May 19, 2017),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0jQTHis3f4 [http://perma.cc/U8M5-BMSH] (transcript available at
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/mayor_landrieu_speech_confeder.html
[http://perma.cc/FZ46-APP6]) (noting, in a speech celebrating the removal of monuments to the “Lost
Cause of the Confederacy,” the “searing truth” that the removed monuments were as much a part of
post-Reconstruction racial terrorism “as a burning cross on someone’s lawn”).
31. See, e.g., Seth McLaughlin, Confederate Heritage Stands Strong in Parts of Rural Virginia,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/15/confederate-statuesstill-stand-in-rural-virginia/ [http://perma.cc/HT5G-9V4T] (quoting Joyce Kistner, the chair of the
Bristol, Virginia, chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, who noted that the chapter has
“had the support of the community from the beginning” and that “[e]verybody has appreciated [the
local Confederate monument]”).
32. See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal & Scott Clement, Rural Divide, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/rural-america/
[http://perma.cc/PZ76-LS5T]
(exploring the results of a Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation survey finding a growing sense
of estrangement held by those living in rural areas from people who live in urban areas); see also KIM
PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN, SUBURBAN AND RURAL
COMMUNITIES 41 (2018) (finding that majorities of both urban and rural Americans “say people who
don’t live in their type of community have a very or somewhat negative view of those who do”).
33. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1167
(2018) [hereinafter Schragger, American Cities] (analyzing the enduring nature of anti-urbanism in
American federalism, and arguing that this “structural anti-urbanism reflects and reinforces the
widening political gap between American cities and other parts of the country”).
34. See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 476–77 (1981).
35. See id.
36. Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built
Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (noting that public places often enshrine “selective and
misleading versions of the past in solid, material forms,” which can “marginalize certain
communities—particularly African American communities—and transmit ideas about racial power
across generations”).
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Similarly, decisions about the preservation and presentation of historic sites or
figures are likely to reflect both past and contemporary perspectives about status
and political power in ways that may seem to disenfranchise those disappointed
with the preservation decision.37 Accordingly, disputes about Confederate
monuments in public places have been and are likely to remain bitterly
contentious: these disputes tend to concentrate the worst aspects of debates
about preservation even as they provide a natural focus for our widening ruralurban divide.
In some states, legal issues about the relative power of state and local
authorities have combined with the underlying causes of the recent monument
disputes in a particularly toxic way.38 More specifically, many of the most intense
conflicts have taken place in states with statutes that restrict the ability of local
communities to alter monuments to the Confederacy in public places. Indeed,
one such statute was involved in the lawsuit over the Louisville-Brandenburg
monument.39 In contrast, many local governments in states without such statutes
have disposed of or altered high-profile Confederate monuments in relatively
short order.40 Following Richard Schragger’s recent work on the invasion of
Charlottesville by white supremacists, this Article refers to these state controls
over Confederate monuments as “statue statutes.”41
Many of these statue statutes are relatively recent, though some date back a
decade or more, and the earliest version of one such statute dates back over a
century.42 Regardless of their age, none of the statue statutes faced significant

37. J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic Preservation Law,
22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 206, 268 (2009) (“Decisions about preservation and presentation of a historic
site . . . will always reflect the perspectives of contemporary society, especially those with power.”).
38. The states in question are Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina,
Mississippi, Kentucky, and South Carolina.
39. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the monument’s removal.
40. Compare, e.g., John Sharp, How Alabama Could Become ‘Ground Zero’ in Renewed Battle
over Confederate Symbols, AL.COM (Apr. 22, 2018), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/04/
confederate_monuments_battle.html [http://perma.cc/4DRD-4WQY] (describing the connection
between Alabama’s very recent statue statute and the intense conflicts over Confederate monuments
around the state), and Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Fight over Virginia’s Confederate Monuments,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-fight-overvirginias-confederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/9ZR2-LC3U] (describing the protracted conflict,
violence, and death surrounding Confederate monuments in Virginia, the state with the oldest statue
statute), with, e.g., Campbell & Broadwater, supra note 25 (describing the 2017 removal of high-profile
Confederate monuments in Baltimore, Maryland, a state without a statue statute), and Mele, supra
note 21 (describing the 2017 removal of high-profile Confederate monuments in New Orleans,
Louisiana, a state without a statue statute).
41. See Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
58, 63 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade] (referring briefly to Virginia’s
“statue statute” in the context of a discussion about the lack of legal authority available to local
governments faced with armed aggressors).
42. For more detail on the history of various statue statutes, see infra Section II. Many of the
relatively recent statue statutes are sometimes titled and referred to by some commentators as
“Heritage Protection Acts,” because versions of that phrase pop up in the acts’ titles for some of the
statue statutes passed in the last decade or so. E.g., Alfred Brophy, Wahlers on NC Monument
Protection Act, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 28, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/11/
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controversy until roughly 2015, when many communities began to reconsider the
public display of Confederate flags and monuments after the Charleston church
massacre.43 All of the statue statutes seek to strip authority away from local
governments that might wish to remove or alter monuments on their own
authority,44 and in so doing they fire the rural-urban divide that provides so
much of the fuel for the underlying conflicts.45
Because many of the conflicts over Confederate monuments are relatively
recent, the statue statutes that help exacerbate some of the worst monument
conflicts have not received the attention they deserve. Moreover, much of the
ink that has been spilled on these statutes tends to focus not on the merit of their
underlying purpose, or lack thereof, but rather on their alleged strength. In other
words, it is frequently said or written that the statue statutes make it terribly
difficult, or even impossible, for local governments to move or modify
Confederate monuments in public places.46 But, as one scholar has already noted
wahlers-on-nc-monument-protection-act.html [http://perma.cc/46L5-W4FR]. This Article will refer to
all such restrictions as “statue statutes,” since the original versions of some of the statutes considered
here are years older—or, in Virginia’s case, over a century older—than the relatively recent Heritage
Protection Acts.
43. See, e.g., Olivo, supra note 29 (noting that Virginia’s statue statute “went largely
unchallenged” from 1904 “until a 2015 legal dispute in Danville,” was sparked “over the removal of a
Confederate flag”).
44. See id.
45. See David A. Graham, Local Officials Want To Remove Confederate Monuments—But
States Won’t Let Them, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
08/when-local-officials-want-to-tear-down-confederate-monuments-but-cant/537351/
[http://perma.cc/959V-EKPC] (noting that a statue statute imposed by the state legislature “can
prevent [local] officials . . . from removing Confederate monuments, but it is unlikely to change minds
of left-leaning electorates in cities like Chapel Hill and Birmingham”).
46. Examples abound of government officials, state legislators, lawyers, and reporters who
emphasize the perceived strength of statue statutes and the difficulty that local governments have
faced and will face if they attempt to remove monuments protected by these statutes. E.g., Jackson
Baker, Author of Heritage Protection Act Cautions City About ‘Consequences’, MEMPHIS FLYER (Sept.
7, 2017, 12:16 PM), http://www.memphisflyer.com/JacksonBaker/archives/2017/09/06/author-ofheritage-protection-act-cautions-city-about-consequences [http://perma.cc/EY2D-F7LV] (quoting the
author of Tennessee’s statue statute, who threatened dire consequences for the Memphis City Council
should it remove certain Confederate monuments); Jeffrey C. Billman, The Mayor of New Orleans
Explains Why North Carolina’s Monuments to White Supremacy Need To Come Down, INDY WEEK
(Durham, N.C.) (May 23, 2017, 3:46 PM), http://www.indyweek.com/editor/archives/2017/05/23/themayor-of-new-orleans-explains-why-north-carolinas-monuments-to-white-supremacy-need-to-comedown [http://perma.cc/S77Y-2KHW] (noting that North Carolina’s statue statute makes “it nearly
impossible” to alter or remove Confederate monuments “from public spaces”); Jessica Bliss & Holly
Meyer, In the South, Confederate Monuments Often Protected, Hard To Remove Thanks to State Laws,
TENNESSEAN (Aug. 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/08/17/southconfederate-monuments-often-protected-hard-remove-state-laws/573226001 [http://perma.cc/WEQ3XBZ2] (noting that statue statutes prevent Confederate monuments “from being taken down or
altered without great difficulty”); Graham, supra note 45 (noting that “[a]cross the South, citizens are
rising up and demanding that their towns and cities remove Confederate monuments,” while in those
cities located in states with statue statutes, “local officials are reckoning with the fact that they don’t
actually have the power to do that”); Josh Magness, There’s a Push To Remove Confederate Statues. In
Some States, That’s Hard or Illegal, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:58 AM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/nation-world/national/article167692922.html [http://perma.cc
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with respect to Virginia’s statue statute,47 and as this Article shows for many of
the state statue statutes,48 this widely held view about the impenetrability of
statue statutes is incorrect.
Until now, the flaws inherent in the statue statutes have been difficult to
see. The true weaknesses of these statutes have been obscured in part by “arcane
issues of state law,”49 which, as Section II shows, are time-consuming to unpack
for several reasons. First, many of the statutes were drafted at different times,
which means that their structure and language vary widely. This has obscured
some of the opportunities for local government action under the statue statutes,
helping to conceal even those opportunities for local action that recur across
multiple statue statutes. Moreover, most of the challenges to the statutes to date
have focused on individual statutes as state-specific obstacles to individual local
government actions. This is understandable, but it tends to obscure some of the
weaknesses that are common to many of the statutes from different
jurisdictions—weaknesses explored in the remainder of this Article. Given the
similarities in the legislative history, text, and structure of many statue statutes,
local governments that wish to remove ostensibly protected monuments have

/78C4-TGDM] (“Despite the seeming momentum to remove [Confederate monuments], a handful of
Southern states have laws that make taking down the controversial Confederate monuments
incredibly challenging—if not impossible.”); Jacob Reynolds, Georgia State Law Makes It Difficult To
Completely Remove or Hide Confederate Monuments, WMAZ (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:25 AM),
http://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/georgia-state-law-makes-it-difficult-to-completely-removeor-hide-confederate-monuments/464932603 [http://perma.cc/TZ83-XMG6] (concluding that Georgia’s
statue statute “may make it impossible for any cities and counties to completely remove or destroy
existing Confederate monuments”); Jessica Schladebeck, It’s Illegal for America To Tear Down All of
Its Confederate Past, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
impossible-america-tear-confederate-article-1.3420524 [http://perma.cc/2PYZ-3UPK] (claiming that
statue statutes “make it next to impossible for America to tear down all that links it to its Confederate
past”); Kaeli Subberwal, Several States Have Erected Laws To Protect Confederate Monuments,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2017, 9:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/states-confederatestatue-laws_us_5996312be4b0e8cc855cb2ab [http://perma.cc/5DGX-AUVE] (noting that a “maze of
statutes” may make conversations about statue removal “moot” in several states); Dan Whisenhunt,
Decatur City Leaders Grappling with Calls To Remove Confederate Monument, DECATURISH (Aug.
15,
2017),
http://decaturish.com/2017/08/decatur-city-leaders-grappling-with-calls-to-removeconfederate-monument [http://perma.cc/4W6R-AV35] (quoting city leaders and state legislators,
including one state senator who “had forgotten” about Georgia’s statue statute but concluded
“[o]bviously [legislators] would need to eliminate that before the locals can take action”).
47. Rich Schragger, Opinion, Is Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Illegal?, RICH. TIMES(Aug.
30,
2017)
[hereinafter
Schragger,
Robert
E.
Lee],
DISPATCH
http://www.richmond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/rich-schragger-column-is-charlottesv
ille-srobert-e-lee-statue/article_888d6495-6176-5cea-9278-71018d293f2a.html [http://perma.cc/2B2Y6B3H].
48. See infra Section II.
49. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional,
SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:07 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/
08/charlottesville_s_monuments_are_unconstitutional.html
[http://perma.cc/GHU6-GPGV].
Schwartzman and Tebbe pointed out the larger constitutional principles at stake in the Charlottesville
monument conflict, beyond the “arcane issues of state law” related to Virginia’s statue statute. Id. The
arguments that Schwartzman and Tebbe raised about the unconstitutionality of statue statutes are
discussed in detail in Section I, infra.
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much to gain from greater coordination of challenges across multiple
jurisdictions.50
Upon closer inspection, the truth emerges: the protections that statue
statutes provide for Confederate monuments are far less extensive than many
have imagined, hoped, or feared.51 Many local governments may be able to move
their Confederate monuments to less prominent locations, or place monuments
into a more appropriate and less celebratory context, even if some statue statutes
survive in something like their current form. Perhaps most importantly, this
Article may help local governments and sympathetic state officials in different
jurisdictions coordinate their efforts to exploit the various opportunities for local
action that are common to multiple statue statutes across different jurisdictions.
Pointing out the practical weaknesses of the statue statutes should not be
interpreted as a defense of or an attempt to rehabilitate either the statue statutes
or the monuments they protect. Writing almost a century and a half ago,
Frederick Douglass called the first wave of “[m]onuments to the ‘lost cause’”
that were going up around the former Confederacy “monuments of folly,” which
could only create a “needless record of stupidity and wrong” and serve “little or
no purpose” in the future beyond “cultivating hatred.”52 Sections I and II of this
Article show that Douglass’s criticism also applies to the more recent statue
statutes enacted to protect these monuments. The execution of the statue
statutes is frequently shoddy, creating opportunities for local governments to
move against protected monuments. But the purpose behind these statutes—to
strip away local control over public spaces and to protect monuments originally
raised to discrimination and institutionalized violence53—is far worse.
It would be best, therefore, if state legislatures simply did away with the
statue statutes altogether, publicly repudiating the statutes themselves and
affirming the rights of local governments to remove or modify the physical and
monumental legacies of discrimination and violence that the statutes purport to
protect. The second-best outcome would be for courts to conclude that the statue

50. See infra notes 115–116, 125, 156, 180–182, 216–217, 263, 317 and accompanying text for
examples of the disparate past and pending challenges to the various statue statutes in different states.
51. See infra Section II for a review of each state statue statute and the opportunities for local
government action.
52. Monuments of Folly, NEW NAT’L ERA (D.C.), Dec. 1, 1870, at 3.
53. For a brief examination of the history and purpose behind many Confederate monuments
themselves and the inseparable relationship between these monuments and campaigns to impose
systems of legal discrimination and extrajudicial violence, see supra and infra notes 1–11, 64–70, 76–78
and accompanying text.
The facial language of most statue statutes does not, of course, refer to this history, nor indeed do
most statue statutes single out the Confederacy or Confederate history. Rather, the statue statutes
tend to refer to American military history generally, or a long list of military conflicts and/or historical
periods that include the Civil War and the Confederacy. See infra notes 126–140, 174–176, 197–198,
218–228, 234–236, 244–245 and accompanying text for examples of this wording. But a close
examination of the statue statutes’ histories, legislative or otherwise, shows that they were designed
with a near-exclusive focus on public monuments to the Confederacy and a desire to strip control from
local governments that might wish to amend or remove such monuments in light of their troubled past
and present. See infra notes 128, 143, 164–165, 197–198, 220–225 and accompanying text.
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statutes are unconstitutional, adopting one or more of the arguments reviewed in
Section I of this Article. Readers can judge for themselves how likely either of
these outcomes might be in the near future. But as far as the prospect of repeal
goes, it should be noted that many executive officials, state legislators, and
academics in states with statue statutes tend to view the prospect of revision as
unlikely, at least in the next few years.54 It must also be remembered that despite
intense local opposition in many cities and towns, substantial majorities of the
American public favor retaining most existing Confederate monuments in public
spaces—by a ratio of two to one, according to some recent polls55—and the
margins are even greater in states with large numbers of Confederate
monuments.56
As Sections I and III of this Article show, the relevant state legislatures or
courts may entirely undo most or all of the statue statutes. But unless and until
this hope is realized, local governments that wish to remove or modify existing
Confederate monuments must either give up or find a path forward within the
existing statutes’ constraints. Given the way that statue statutes are usually
described—as “impossible” obstacles to removing or modifying Confederate
monuments, “regardless of the desires of local municipalities”57—it would be
easy for ordinary citizens and elected officials who want to get rid of
Confederate monuments to grow discouraged or even give up entirely. However,
as this Article shows, giving up in the face of statue statutes is a mistake.
Instead of giving up, local governments that wish to modify or get rid of
Confederate monuments in public places should be encouraged to challenge the
relevant statue statutes. Many local governments may be able to challenge
existing statue statutes in a coordinated fashion, exploiting the opportunities for
local action that are common across multiple jurisdictions and using their
collective action to alter public opinion in their respective states and around the

54. E.g., Michael Jones, Petition Seeks Change in Ga. Law that Protects Confederate Monuments,
WABE (Atlanta) (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.wabe.org/petition-seeks-change-ga-law-protectsconfederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/435Q-LNJG] (quoting state representatives and academics
hostile to Georgia’s statue statute who uniformly conclude that amending or abolishing the statute is
improbable in the next few years); see also Kirk Brown et al., Gov. McMaster Doubts Efforts To
Remove Confederate Monuments Will Spread to South Carolina, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.) (Aug. 14,
2017, 11:13 PM), http://www.heraldonline.com/latest-news/article167231897.html [http://perma.cc/
4BXU-ECJU] (quoting South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster and South Carolina House of
Representatives Speaker Jay Lucas, who each ruled out any changes or exceptions to the state’s statue
statute in the foreseeable future).
55. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 28 (noting that 54% of respondents thought Confederate
monuments “should remain in all public spaces” while only 27% thought the monuments “should be
removed from all public spaces”).
56. See NPR/PBS NEWSHOUR/MARIST POLL NATIONAL TABLES, “DO YOU THINK STATUES
HONORING LEADERS OF THE CONFEDERACY SHOULD REMAIN/BE REMOVED” 9 (Aug. 2017) (noting
that 66% of respondents in the South thought such monuments should remain); see also supra notes
27–32 and accompanying text (gathering similar polls).
57. Melba Newsome, Is Removing Confederate Monuments like Erasing History?, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 25, 2017, 4:28 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/are-removing-confederatemonuments-erasing-history-n750526 [http://perma.cc/7R7R-RSJB]; see also supra note 46 (gathering
numerous similar sources).
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nation. As this Article shows, when we tug at the seams of the statue statutes, we
find room for local governments to remove or modify many existing Confederate
monuments in public spaces even if the statutes remain in place indefinitely. In
other words, even if this Article’s modest effort does not entirely unstitch the
statue statutes, it does show that the statutes’ protections for Confederate
monuments are more threadbare than their defenders imagine and their
opponents fear. As a result, local governments that wish to remove or modify
existing Confederate monuments in jurisdictions with statue statutes have more
options than many have supposed and reported.
In addition, by pointing out the thin and ragged nature of the protections
existing statue statutes provide, this Article seeks to encourage state legislators
to reconsider the existence of statue statutes in jurisdictions where they have
been enacted and to deter the passage of additional statue statutes where such
bills have been considered, but not enacted, in recent years.58 Striking the statue
statutes from the books may take a long time. But because these statutes, at least
in their current form, leave many avenues open for local governments to remove
or modify existing monuments, legislators in states that either already have or
are considering such statutes should ask themselves: What useful purpose, if any,
does this legislation serve? As this Article shows, when the histories and effects
of the statue statutes are examined in detail, it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that—like the monuments they ostensibly protect—these statutes serve little or
no purpose worth defending, but rather perpetuate a long history of
institutionalized racism and violence.59
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three sections. Section I provides
short histories of Confederate monuments in public spaces and the statue
statutes that purport to protect these monuments, and a short summary of some
constitutional arguments advanced by other scholars, which, if adopted, would
do away with the statue statutes altogether. Section II provides a close and
critical examination of the various statue statutes themselves and identifies
opportunities within each state’s statute that some or all local governments might
exploit to remove or modify at least some Confederate monuments in public
spaces. Finally, Section III provides arguments against the statue statutes’
potential rehabilitation. More specifically, Section III suggests that courts should

58. For example, in 2017 the Arkansas legislature considered a statue statute, the Arkansas
Military Heritage Protection Act, which passed the relevant committees in both houses but failed to
pass the full legislature. To Create the Arkansas Military Heritage Protection Act, H.B. 1297, 91st
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2017/2017R/Pages/
BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1297 [http://perma.cc/U7FY-T4FC]. To take another example,
Louisiana’s state legislature has considered multiple statue statutes in recent years, though to date all
have failed to pass. See Julia O’Donoghue, Confederate Monument Protection Effort Stalls in
Louisiana Legislature—For Now, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/confederate_monument_bill_pass.html [http://perma.cc/
R2GK-KLXW].
59. Cf. Monuments of Folly, supra note 52 (arguing that “there [would be] little or no purpose in
[the] erection” of the earliest Confederate monuments, because the monuments would fail to alter the
verdict of history upon their subjects and serve only to foster “the keen remembrance of . . . enormous
wrong[s]” that “they must necessarily perpetuate”).
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not accept the vague appeals to intrastate preemption that some states have
already offered in early attempts to close off opportunities for local action under
the statue statutes. Section III also argues that attempts to repair the broken
statue statutes by eliminating opportunities for local action should only make the
statutes more vulnerable to the constitutional challenges outlined in Section I.
I.

BROKEN FROM THE BEGINNING: THE HISTORY AND FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
OF CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS AND THE STATUE STATUTES

Like the Louisville-Brandenburg monument,60 the history of most
Confederate monuments is intimately and inextricably bound up with campaigns
of racial intimidation and violence designed to overturn Reconstruction, to
establish Jim Crow, and to resist integration after Brown v. Board of
Education.61 Section I begins by briefly reviewing the historical relationship
between public Confederate monuments and patterns of systematic oppression
and violence.62 Section I then reviews arguments advanced by others that the
statue statutes are unconstitutional in light of the messages of oppression and
violence that many Confederate monuments were designed to reinforce.63
A.

The Troubling History Behind Confederate Monuments and Statue Statutes

A recent comprehensive survey and report prepared by the Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) on Confederate monuments across the nation helps
to illustrate how the dedication of Confederate monuments spiked in two distinct
periods. The first period, from around 1900 through the 1920s, encompassed the
enactment of Jim Crow laws and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan as the
“Invisible Empire.”64 The second period, from the mid-1950s through the late
1960s, encompassed both the modern civil rights movement and widespread

60. See supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
61. See Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that in Georgia,
“expressions of interest in Confederate history” and the erection and defense of Confederate symbols
and monuments in public places “coalesced with public outcry in reaction to desegregation mandates
by the Supreme Court”); Clowney, supra note 36, at 10–13 (describing the ways in which Confederate
monuments cemented post-Reconstruction threats of violence and patterns of racial stratification);
Sophie Abramowitz et al., Tools of Displacement: How Charlottesville, Virginia’s Confederate Statues
Helped Decimate the City’s Historically Successful Black Communities, SLATE (June 23, 2017, 3:20
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2017/06/how_charlottesville_s_confedera
te_statues_helped_decimate_the_city_s_historically.html [http://perma.cc/MY9U-USEX] (arguing that
the Charlottesville monuments were built atop land confiscated from prosperous African American
residents of Charlottesville and subsequently served to mark off “areas of political and financial power
as part of the ideology of the Lost Cause” of the Confederacy); Mele, supra note 21 (noting that one of
the four monuments removed by New Orleans expressly commemorated the 1874 “Battle” of Liberty
Place, honoring members of the Crescent City White League who fought against the then-racially
integrated New Orleans Police Department).
62. See infra Part I.A.
63. See infra Part I.B.
64. BOOTH GUNTER ET AL., S. POVERTY LAW CTR., WHOSE HERITAGE? PUBLIC SYMBOLS OF
THE CONFEDERACY 12–15 (2016).
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resistance to desegregation.65
The SPLC report details the correlation between the dedication of
Confederate monuments and periods of intense racial discrimination and
violence.66 But many other thoughtful observers have long noted the link
between these monuments and institutionalized discrimination.67 For example,
during travels through Atlanta and the Carolinas in 1931, W. E. B. Du Bois
wrote of the unavoidable and mutually reinforcing connection between the sheer
number of physical monuments to the Confederacy in public spaces—“awful
things” that should have been dedicated “to the memory of those who fought to
Perpetuate Human Slavery”—and the similar omnipresence of both “the rules of
‘Jim-Crow’” and the prevailing “custom of murder.”68
Notwithstanding this intimate and inextricable connection between
Confederate monuments in public civic spaces and the nation’s deeply fraught
history of segregation, intimidation, and violence, the continued presence of
these monuments in public spaces remains popular.69 Defenders of the continued
existence of Confederate monuments in public civic spaces offer many
justifications for the monuments’ preservation. Some contemporary defenders of
Confederate monuments simply resort to the racially charged threats of violence
that have been associated with these monuments since their creation.70 Others
base their arguments on family, personal, or cultural connections with the dead
Confederates to whom the monuments are dedicated.71
The most thoughtful defenders of retaining at least some Confederate
monuments in public spaces tend to deplore what many Confederate monuments
represent but argue that monument removal or destruction might lead to
historical amnesia about the history of racial discrimination that they represent.72

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. E.g., Monuments of Folly, supra note 52.
68. W. E. B. Du Bois, Postscript, 40 CRISIS 278, 279 (1931).
69. See supra notes 27–32, 55–56 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Kate Royals, Rep. Karl Oliver: Those Removing Confederate Monuments ‘Should
Be Lynched’, MISS. TODAY (May 21, 2017), http://mississippitoday.org/2017/05/21/rep-karl-oliverthose-removing-confederate-monuments-should-be-lynched/ [http://perma.cc/FS2D-L7LZ] (quoting a
Mississippi state representative who wrote that those involved in the “heinous and horrific” removal
and destruction of Confederate monuments, “erected in the loving memory of our family and fellow
Southern Americans, . . . should be LYNCHED!”).
71. See, e.g., Justin Fedich, Sons of Confederate Veterans Work To Preserve History of the South,
FAYETTE COUNTY NEWS (Ga.) (July 1, 2017), http://fayette-news.net/sons-of-confederate-veteranswork-to-preserve-confederate-history/ [http://perma.cc/MQ7Y-PTVT] (quoting a camp commander in
the Sons of Confederate Veterans who argues that he and his associates should not “have to give up
the recognition of [their] heroes, of [their] leaders,” and that honoring their dead Confederate
ancestors “binds [them] together”); R. Kevin Stone, Opinion, Confederate Monuments Honor
Sacrifice, ROANOKE-CHOWAN NEWS-HERALD (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.dailyadvance.com/
Chowan/2017/11/29/Confederate-monuments-honor-sacrifice.html
[http://perma.cc/9UA7-E5WS]
(expressing dismay “that the legacy of [Confederate] ancestors is now being . . . tarnished”).
72. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Opinion, Why We Shouldn’t Pull Down All Those Confederate
Memorials, NEWSWEEK (July 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/why-we-shouldnt-pull-down-allthose-confederate-memorials-352222 [http://perma.cc/968D-WU2R] (arguing that in eliminating
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Frequently, those who wish monuments to remain in public places for these
reasons also want to modify them to provide a balanced historical record,
thereby transforming the monuments from a source of intimidation into an
opportunity for education.73 But, as Section II shows, this sort of monument
modification is ostensibly forbidden under most statue statutes to precisely the
same degree as monument removal.74 Because the statutes forbid both
modification and removal of Confederate monuments, this Article takes no
position on whether outright removal or monument modification is the best
approach, either generally or in any specific situation.75
In sum, despite the enduring popularity of Confederate monuments with
the general public, experts from a variety of disciplines have concluded that most
Confederate monuments prominently displayed in public civic spaces should not
remain—at least not in anything like their current places of honor.76 Indeed, in a

Confederate monuments, “there’s a danger that we’ll forget the connections of past racial crimes to
current racial inequality”); Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Opinion, Trump Is Right: Confederate
Memorials Should Stay, TIMES HIGHER EDUC., (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.timeshighereducation.
com/opinion/trump-right-confederate-memorials-should-stay [http://perma.cc/T4LC-96QD] (arguing
that Confederate monuments “cannot hurt us, but can remind us of the lessons and legacies of the
past”); Lawrence A. Kuznar, Opinion, I Detest Our Confederate Monuments. But They Should
Remain., WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-detest-our-confeder
ate-monuments-but-they-should-remain/2017/08/18/13d25fe8-843c-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html
[http://perma.cc/KG89-95BB] (arguing that preserving Confederate monuments is important because
of their “constant testimony” to the devastating impact of racial discrimination).
73. See, e.g., Alfred Brophy, How Taking Down Confederate Monuments Just Covers Up a
Larger Problem, FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/18/confederate-monumentremoval-charlottesville [http://perma.cc/K3LX-K4RA] (insisting that the “monuments should not be
left alone, but must be contextualized, so that they can serve as a daily lesson of what . . . the
community once thought, and also how we think differently now”).
74. See infra Section II for a discussion of each statue statute’s restrictions on removal,
modification, alteration, and other actions that local governments might take with respect to
Confederate monuments.
75. Accordingly, references to either monument removal or monument modification in this
Article are generally intended to be interchangeable.
76. Examples of academic criticism of the placement of Confederate monuments in public civic
spaces without educational context could fill dozens of pages of footnote text. For some representative
examples of academics from various disciplines who argue against the continued placement of such
monuments in public civic spaces, see, for example, Gonzalo Casals et al., Tear Down the Confederate
Monuments—But What Next? Twelve Art Historians and Scholars on the Way Forward, ARTNET NEWS
(Aug.
23,
2017),
http://news.artnet.com/art-world/confederate-monuments-experts-1058411
[http://perma.cc/L7YR-NZQS] (gathering a range of expert opinions about the best way to remove or
modify various Confederate monuments in public spaces); Julian Chambliss, Opinion, Don’t Call
Them Memorials, FRIEZE (Aug. 23, 2017), http://frieze.com/article/dont-call-them-memorials
[http://perma.cc/L5WA-9UEZ] (arguing that Confederate monuments in public civic spaces should
neither be called nor treated as monuments, but rather as “political markers . . . [created] to celebrate
the re-establishment of white rule after Reconstruction” that should be disposed of); Jane Dailey,
Opinion, Baltimore’s Confederate Monument Was Never About ‘History and Culture’, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 17, 2017, 11:11 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/confederate-monumentshistory-trump-baltimore_us_5995a3a6e4b0d0d2cc84c952 [http://perma.cc/L5WA-9UEZ] (defending
Baltimore’s removal of its Confederate monument, which “was designed to intimidate African
Americans and to reassure white Americans in a moment of rising black power”); Kristine Phillips,
Historians: No, Mr. President, Washington and Jefferson Are Not the Same as Confederate Generals,
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recent statement, the American Historical Association recommended
reconsidering the placement of Confederate monuments in public civic spaces
because they were “part and parcel of the initiation of legally mandated
segregation,” designed “to intimidate African Americans politically and isolate
them from the mainstream of public life.”77 The Association concluded that
altering or removing Confederate monuments from places of pride in public civic
spaces neither changes nor erases history but merely alters what local
communities “decide is worthy of civic honor.”78
The statue statutes analyzed at length in this Article are even harder to
defend than the continued existence of the underlying monuments themselves.
Recall that many of the most thoughtful defenders of preserving Confederate
monuments in public spaces wish to modify their presentation or to exclude
them from certain particularly sensitive public spaces, in order to provide a
balanced and more accurate record that honestly reckons with the history of
violence and intimidation that these monuments have reinforced.79 But as Alfred
Brophy has pointed out, the restrictions that statue statutes impose on local
governments’ abilities to modify or remove monuments undercut the very
arguments for the existence of such monuments in the first place.80
Building upon this criticism of both the monuments themselves and the
statue statutes that purport to protect them, some scholars have argued that

WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/08/16/histor
ians-no-mr-president-washington-and-jefferson-are-not-the-same-as-confederate-generals
[http://
perma.cc/LSE9-RVG2] (quoting numerous historians who argue that Confederate monuments in
public civic spaces should be moved or “delegitimized” in some way); Nova Safo, Are Confederate
Monuments Important Works of Art?, DAILY MAIL (London) (Aug. 18, 2017, 4:49 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4803916/Are-Confederate-monuments-important-worksart.html [http://perma.cc/8Z46-TYYD] (gathering opinions of historians of art and concluding that
most Confederate monuments are of “mediocre” aesthetic quality at best); Dell Upton, Confederate
Monuments and Civic Values in the Wake of Charlottesville, SOC’Y ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS
BLOG (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.sah.org/publications-and-research/sah-blog/sah-blog/2017/09/13/
confederate-monuments-and-civic-values-in-the-wake-of-charlottesville [http://perma.cc/RL4N-833A]
(concluding that “[w]hatever the [ultimate] disposition of the Confederate monuments, it seems clear
that for reasons of justice, equity, and civic values, they must first of all be removed from civic space”
because their “white-supremacist character is more important” than any aesthetic or historical
attribute that can be offered in their defense).
77. AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT ON CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS (2017), http://www.
historians.org/news-and-advocacy/statements-and-resolutions-of-support-and-protest/aha-statementon-confederate-monuments [http://perma.cc/J5Q3-STHD].
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text; see also Alfred L. Brophy, Reframing a
Historic Narrative, LEX, Fall 2018, at 25, 27 (suggesting that while there are some “good reasons” for
keeping some modified Confederate monuments in some public spaces, “they should not be in front of
courthouses, where they tell members of the community that they are not welcome”).
80. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Opinion, Legislating Confederate Monuments, WINSTON-SALEM
J. (July 23, 2015), http://www.journalnow.com/opinion/columnists/alfred-l-brophy-legislatingconfederate-monuments/article_1db4acd4-309f-11e5-870c-73bbd75fa258.html [http://perma.cc/H64TRFUS] (concluding that, although “[t]here are good reasons not to remove Confederate [statues],” if,
through state statue statutes, “we are going to get local governments out of the business of monument
removal, maybe we should also get them out of the business of monument placement”).
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these statutes are unconstitutional.81 These arguments are briefly reviewed in the
following Part.
B.

The Constitutional Flaws of Statue Statutes

The constitutional arguments against the statue statutes have taken many
forms, but perhaps the most straightforward argument proceeds on free speech
grounds. The free speech argument against statue statutes can be boiled down to
something like the following: Forcing anyone—an individual, a local
government—into expressive activity violates the First Amendment. Erecting
and maintaining a statue in a public place is expressive activity. Accordingly,
forcing local governments to erect or maintain statues in public places violates
the First Amendment.82
One of the necessary premises for this argument—the idea that local
governments engage in expressive activity when they erect and maintain public
monuments—was recognized by the Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum.83 In Summum, a religious organization founded in 1975 sought to
erect a religious stone monument containing the “Seven Aphorisms of
SUMMUM” in a public park that contained other monuments donated by
private groups or individuals, including a wishing well, a monument to
September 11, and a similarly sized stone monument of the Ten
Commandments.84 The Court held that “[p]ermanent monuments displayed on
public property typically represent government speech,” rather than the creation
of a forum for private speech, because monuments, “by definition, [are]
structure[s] . . . designed as a means of expression.”85 Indeed, noting the long
history of monuments as government expression, the Court also held that even
“privately financed and donated monuments” also “speak for the government”
that accepts them and displays them on public land.86 Accordingly, the Court in
Summum concluded that the city could reject a religious organization’s request
to display and maintain a stone monument with religious texts in a public park,
because the city’s choice about what monuments to accept and display on public
property “is best viewed as a form of government speech.”87 As applied to
Confederate monuments, then, some have argued that the reasoning of
Summum should control for state statue statutes, which—like the losing religious
organization in Summum itself—seek to compel an identical kind of local
government expression, often against that local government’s wishes.88

81. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
82. Aneil Kovvali, Confederate Statute Removal, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 82, 83 (2017) (“The
free speech objection is simply stated. When a city government erects or maintains a monument, it is
speaking. A statute forcing a city to retain a Confederate monument thus compels the city to engage in
speech it finds offensive.”).
83. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
84. Summum, 555 U.S. at 464–65.
85. Id. at 470.
86. Id. at 470–71.
87. Id. at 464–65, 481.
88. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 83–84.
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A related constitutional argument against statue statutes is grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. This argument stems from
the same premise outlined in the free speech context—the idea that a city’s
decision to erect or maintain a monument is constitutionally significant
expression. The key additional insight upon which this argument depends is that
government entities, unlike private citizens, cannot engage in expression that
denigrates racial or religious minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause.89 In other words, a town could not erect a sign that read “This town is for
whites only,” and local officials should recognize that Confederate monuments in
public spaces represent something akin to such a sign.90 According to this
argument, even if a state statute forbids it, local officials should rely on the
supremacy of the Federal Constitution and conclude that removal of
Confederate monuments is not only permissible but indeed required by the
Equal Protection Clause.91
Two additional constitutional arguments against statue statutes depart from
the shared premise discussed above and focus instead on the individuals affected
by Confederate monuments rather than the local governments forced to
maintain monuments by these statutes. For example, some have argued that
state statue statutes are unconstitutional because they violate the free speech
acts of individual protesters against those monuments.92 They analogize the
statue statutes to the prohibitions on flag burning deemed unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson93 and United States v. Eichman.94 Like
burning a flag, urging a local government to remove a protected monument
qualifies as protected speech, and because this speech does not materially harm
others, there is no legitimate state interest in suppressing it.95
To be clear, the argument outlined here does not imply that anyone, acting
on their own, has the right to remove or destroy an existing monument that
belongs to their local government.96 Rather, this argument against the statue
89. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 648–49, 658–
65 (2013) (arguing that “[r]acialized government expression” can be an unconstitutional violation of
both anticlassification and antisubordination interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, just as religious government expression can violate the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause); see also Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 49 (applying these arguments to
the case of Confederate monuments and state statue statutes).
90. Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 49.
91. Id.
92. E.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Debate over Confederate Monuments, TAKE
CARE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/the-debate-over-confederate-monuments
[http://perma.cc/9SUN-RQUE].
93. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (overturning a conviction for flag desecration as inconsistent with
the First Amendment).
94. 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990) (applying Texas v. Johnson and concluding that a flag protection
statute could not constitutionally be applied).
95. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 92 (arguing that “[j]ust as in the case of flag desecration
laws,” the goal of “avoiding offense is not a sufficient reason to stifle [the] expressive conduct” of
those who wish to protest against or advocate for the removal of Confederate monuments).
96. See id. (“The constitutional right to be free of restrictions on flag burning . . . does not
extend to burning a particular flag that belongs to someone else . . . .”).
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statutes concludes that it is an unconstitutional restriction of expression for states
to block the full expression of that sentiment with a statute. In other words, by
“barring the removal of [a] monument” the state has also restricted expressive
protest against the monuments, and in so doing the state has unconstitutionally
placed its own “coercive weight on the expressive scales.”97
A fourth and final argument for the unconstitutionality of statue statutes
relies on the Equal Protection Clause. According to this argument, statue
statutes distort the political process by making it more difficult for victims of
discrimination to seek protection.98 This argument draws on analogies between
statue statutes and local or state controls on antidiscrimination laws, like those at
issue in Hunter v. Erickson99 and Romer v. Evans.100
In Hunter, a city fair housing ordinance with robust antidiscrimination
provisions led to widespread backlash.101 In turn, this backlash led to an
amendment to the city charter, passed by a direct vote of the city’s voting
electors during a general election, which provided that any future fair housing
ordinances had to be approved by a majority of the electors during a general
election before becoming operative.102 The Court in Hunter struck down this
restrictive amendment to the city charter, holding that the amendment
impermissibly discriminated against minorities in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause by imposing a system of restraints that made it more difficult
to enact legislation on their behalf, which the Court concluded was the practical
equivalent of diluting minorities’ votes or giving one group smaller
representation than another of comparable size.103
Similarly, in Romer, Colorado adopted an amendment to its state
constitution prohibit local ordinances that limited discrimination based on sexual
orientation.104 The Court in Romer struck down this state constitutional
amendment on grounds similar to those invoked in Hunter, holding that it
impermissibly limited the rights of a minority group by preventing them from
obtaining redress from discrimination through targeted legislation.105
Accordingly, some opponents of statue statutes have argued that they are
analogously unconstitutional because, like the amendment to the city charter
struck down in Hunter and the state constitutional amendment struck down in
Romer, the statue statutes force those seeking remedies for discriminatory
actions with a local or sublocal impact to convince larger groups for redress,

97. Id.
98. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 85.
99. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
100. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
101. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386–87.
102. See id. at 387.
103. Id. at 392–93.
104. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–25.
105. See id. at 631 (noting that the targeted minority, under the state constitutional amendment,
“can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to
amend the State Constitution or perhaps . . . by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability”).
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thereby diluting their voting power.106
For several reasons, many local governments will want to adopt some or all
of the arguments outlined above even when they seek to act or litigate using the
arguments discussed in Section II of this Article. First and most obviously, unlike
the arguments outlined in Section II, the arguments discussed above do not seek
opportunities for local action within the existing statutes; rather, they seek to
sweep away the statue statutes altogether. And, if these arguments succeed, they
will provide local governments that wish to remove or alter Confederate
monuments with near-total freedom.
In addition, even if the sweeping arguments outlined in this Part fail to
persuade courts, they may nevertheless prove effective in swaying public
opinion,107 which, as noted at the outset, still favors retaining Confederate
monuments in many places.108 To take just one example, local governments may
fail to convince courts that statue statutes violate the First Amendment.109 But
merely articulating this argument may help make the public more aware of the
problematic history and expressive content of the monuments themselves, as
well as the injustice of compelling local governments to keep Confederate
monuments in place when the local population wants them changed or removed.
Perhaps more importantly, the strategies and arguments outlined below in
Section II, which provide local governments with opportunities for action if the
statue statutes survive, may have a useful role to play in advancing the
arguments outlined here in Part I.B, which are designed to strike down the statue
statutes altogether. More specifically, if local governments carefully challenge
existing statue statutes along the lines discussed in Section II, then they should
be able to frame the issues to enhance the constitutional arguments analyzed
above.
II. “FLAWED” IN PRACTICE: A CLOSE EXAMINATION OF STATE STATUE
STATUTES REVEALS MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
ALTER OR REMOVE CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS
Section II examines the various opportunities for local governments to alter
or remove Confederate monuments under the various individual statue statutes.
These opportunities include: protections that may be limited based on the age of
the monuments, protections that may be limited based on the location of the
monuments, protections that may be limited based on the ownership of the
monuments, and enforcement provisions that are limited or entirely absent
under some statutes. This Article uses the term “opportunities” for local
government action to refer to gaps in the near-universal protection for

106. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 85–87.
107. Cf. id. at 84 (noting that “[m]uch commentary has sought to defend the speech of
protestors seeking to preserve” Confederate monuments, so it is surely “worth defending the speech of
Charlottesville itself, a city that had rejected the monument and what it stands for”).
108. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
109. Kovvali, supra note 82, at 83 (noting that the free speech arguments against statue statutes
“may or may not make for a winning legal challenge”).
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Confederate monuments that these statutes are popularly presumed to
provide—specific avenues left open under the statutes that local governments
might exploit to modify or remove at least some Confederate monuments.
Section II shows that many such opportunities exist and that statutes do not
constitute impossible barriers to the modification or removal of Confederate
monuments.110
Of course, what this Article refers to as “opportunities” for local
government action might seem like “flaws” in the statute from another
perspective, one concerned with using the statue statutes to preserve
Confederate monuments in places of public honor and respect. But, as discussed
in Section I, this Article has already concluded that the primary flaw of the
statutes is their existence in the first place. Thus, it would be most accurate to
think of these as opportunities for local government action—a set of second-best
solutions to the underlying problem that the statue statutes represent. More
specifically, these opportunities represent solutions that interested local
governments and sympathetic state officials may wish to consider pursuing so
long as the statutes exist in something like their present condition.
While many of the individual statue statutes provide similar opportunities
for local government action, no two statutes share the exact same set of gaps.
These discrepancies are due to differences in the construction and drafting of the
statutes themselves, which were created at different times and, in some cases,
amended many times as well.111 In addition, differences in the structures and
drafting styles of the various statue statutes mean that some of the individual
statutes have their own idiosyncratic gaps in coverage, which are not replicated
in many or any other state’s statutes.112 As a result, the statue statutes defy easy
categorization. Accordingly, the bulk of Section II provides a close critical
review of each individual statute, picking out the opportunities for local
government action unique to each. Section II also identifies opportunities for
local government action that recur across multiple states’ statutes.
One of the most promising opportunities for local government action
relates to the time periods of some statutes’ coverage. More specifically, several
of the statutes explicitly or implicitly break down the Confederate monuments
into categories based on when the monuments were created,113 and some of
these temporal categories of monuments may be mostly or even entirely
unprotected. For example, Alabama’s statue statute provides different forms of
protection to monuments that have been in place for less than twenty years, to
those that have been in place for between twenty and forty years, and to those

110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
111. For example, Virginia’s statute was originally passed in 1904, and it has since been
amended or recodified ten times, see infra notes 126–139 and accompanying text, whereas Alabama’s
statute was not enacted until 2017, see infra note 191 and accompanying text.
112. For example, Kentucky’s statute requires a state commission to approve potentially eligible
monuments for protection under the statute; in other words, unlike other states’ statue statutes,
monuments do not automatically qualify for protection based on their age or subject matter. See infra
note 260 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-232 (West 2018).
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that have been in place for over forty years.114 Local governments have already
seized upon different versions of this opportunity in Charlottesville, Virginia,115
and Birmingham, Alabama,116 where they are now being tested in litigation.
A second opportunity for local government action presented by many but
not all state statue statutes relates to the location of protected monuments. More
specifically, some statue statutes refer to monuments that are currently located
on or are themselves public property.117 This suggests that some local
governments may be able to evade the restrictions by conveying either the
monument itself or the civic space where the monument stands to a sympathetic
private actor. This private actor could then remove or alter the Confederate
monument free from penalty because the monument would no longer be or be
located on public property.118 The City of Memphis recently attempted to take
advantage of this opportunity, with efforts that were tested in litigation and then
addressed by the Tennessee state legislature.119 Care must be taken by local
governments when attempting to exploit this opportunity, for the mere
substitution of private for public authority may not be enough for monuments, or
the land on which they rest, to be treated as private property.120 In order to
exploit this opportunity, local governments may need to separate themselves
entirely from the management or control of the land where the monuments once
114. Id.
115. See Schragger, Robert E. Lee, supra note 47 (“Since the monuments statute did not apply to
cities until 1997, [Charlottesville] is free to do whatever it wants with the monuments constructed prior
to that year.”). But see Eric Hartley & Ana Ley, Judge Rules in Favor of Groups Trying To Keep
Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Where It Is, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Oct. 4, 2017),
http://pilotonline.com/news/government/virginia/article_bb1af08e-f426-53ee-ad72-c73239f99b45.html
[http://perma.cc/7NLW-JURR] (noting that the initial ruling in the Charlottesville dispute was that the
statute could apply retroactively to certain monuments). This ruling is contrary to that reached by
other Virginia lower courts in other monuments disputes. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying
text. As a result, the Charlottesville dispute is expected to reach the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Hartley & Ley, supra. Other Virginia cities wishing to remove or alter their own Confederate
monuments will want to keep a close eye on Charlottesville’s case. Id.
116. Kayla Gladney, Mayor Bell Files Motion To Dismiss Lawsuit over Confederate Monument,
CBS42 (Birmingham, Ala.) (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:36 PM), http://wiat.com/2017/09/20/mayor-bell-filesmotion-to-dismiss-lawsuit-over-confederate-monument/ [http://perma.cc/T733-EWPD].
117. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(a)–(b) (West 2018).
118. This gap in coverage may be less significant for those statue statutes that define protected
monuments as those that were “erected” on public property, as such a formulation might protect such
monuments even if their location has been ceded to a private group. Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-165(A) (West 2018) (covering all monuments “erected on public property of the State or any of
its political subdivisions”), with, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (covering any monument that
presently “is, or is located on, public property”). See also infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text.
119. Ryan Poe, Forrest Family, Sons of Confederate Veterans Sue over Takedown of Memphis
Statues, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.) (Jan. 12, 2018, 9:58 AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/
story/news/government/city/2018/01/12/forrest-family-sons-confederate-veterans-sues-over-takedownmemphis-statues/1027918001/ [http://perma.cc/8T4Q-7XVC] [hereinafter Poe, Forrest Family]. See
also infra notes 178–186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the removal of the Memphis
monuments and the state legislature’s response.
120. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300–02 (1966) (holding that a segregated park
remained subject to the Fourteenth Amendment when a local government transferred it to private
trustees).
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stood,121 which may not be appropriate in every situation. In addition, local
governments may face restrictions on how they can dispose of public property,
which may frustrate buyers who are primarily or solely interested in purchasing
the relevant property to help remove or alter a prominent Confederate
monument.122
A third opportunity for local government action presented by a few state
statutes relates to the penalties, or lack thereof, for violations of the statutes.
More specifically, although many of the statutes provide for steep fines and jail
time for anyone who moves or modifies a covered monument,123 others are silent
about the penalties for such actions.124 This absence of any real penalty for
ostensibly forbidden actions, or “penalty gap,” creates obvious opportunities for
action by local governments that wish to remove or modify Confederate
monuments. Indeed, one such penalty gap in the Alabama statute is already part
of litigation that has recently emerged over a Confederate monument in
Birmingham.125
These three main opportunities for local government action under the
statue statutes—the temporal discrepancies, the exclusive focus on monuments
that are or are located on public property, and the penalty gap—recur frequently
across different jurisdictions. But because each statue statute was drafted with its
own structure and language, each provides a unique set of challenges and
opportunities for local governments that wish to alter or modify Confederate
monuments. The remainder of Section II is given over to a detailed critical
examination of each state’s statue statute.
A.

Virginia’s Statue Statute
The history of Virginia’s general statue statute, the oldest and in many ways

121. See id. at 302 (noting that ongoing local control caused the “predominant character and
purpose of [the] park [to remain] municipal” rather than private). The idea of privatizing parks will
concern some readers, due in part to the history of this technique as a device to buttress segregation in
situations like that reviewed in Evans v. Newton. Id. These concerns are entirely appropriate:
privatizing the most public spaces in a community is strong medicine, which should not be lightly
taken. Against these concerns must be set the desire of some local governments to address the
presence of Confederate monuments in the communities’ public spaces.
122. For example, in North Carolina, with relatively few exceptions local governments are
required to dispose of real property through one of a few specified competitive bidding procedures.
See Tyler Mulligan, Sale of Historic Structures by NC Local Governments for Redevelopment, COATES’
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T (Dec. 16, 2014), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/sale-ofhistoric-structures-by-nc-local-governments-for-redevelopment/ [http://perma.cc/52NS-L4YZ] (citing,
inter alia, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 160A-268 to -270 (West 2018)).
123. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137 (West 2018) (providing that violations of Virginia’s statue
statute shall be treated as various degrees of misdemeanors or felonies, depending on the degree of
intent behind the act and the value of the damage done to the monument).
124. See, for example, infra note 252 and accompanying text for a description of the absence of
penalties from the Mississippi statue statute, and the pending and failed past attempts to amend the
statute to incorporate penalties for its violation.
125. Gladney, supra note 116.
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one of the most restrictive, dates back to 1904,126 although some Confederate
monuments in Virginia were specifically authorized by earlier legislative
action.127 The 1904 version of the general Virginia statue statute provided that
the circuit court of a county, acting with the concurrence of that county’s board
of supervisors, could “authorize and permit” anyone to erect “a Confederate
monument upon the public square of such county at the county seat thereof.”128
Once the monument was in place, neither the relevant local government
agencies nor “any other person or persons whatever” could “disturb or
interfere” with the monument.129 Finally, the statute also provided that neither
the local government nor any other person could “prevent the citizens of said
county from taking all proper measures and exercising all proper means for the
protection, preservation, and care of” such a monument.130 The statute was then
further amended or recodified in 1910,131 1930,132 1945,133 1962,134 1982,135
1988,136 1997,137 1998,138 2005,139 and 2010.140 In addition to this general statue
statute, as noted above, several Confederate monuments in Virginia were
created by monument-specific state statutes, some of which contain specific
restrictions on whether the monument at issue can be disturbed.141 As a result,
some local governments may face additional restrictions on modifying or

126. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va. Acts 62. The current version of Virginia’s statue
statute, which reflects all subsequent amendments, is codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (West
2018).
127. See Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711,
at *3 (noting that some of these state statutes specifically authorizing the erection of Confederate
monuments predate the first version of Virginia’s general monument statute, and that some of the
statue-specific statutes “contain restrictions on the disturbance of the monument” while “others are
silent” on this issue).
128. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va. Acts 62.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Act of Feb. 9, 1910, Ch. 17, § 1, 1910 Va. Acts 21, 22.
132. Act of Feb. 28, 1930, Ch. 76, 1930 Va. Acts 86.
133. Act of Apr. 5, 1945, Ch. 55, 1945 Va. Acts Extra Sess. 47.
134. Act of Apr. 3, 1962, Ch. 623, 1962 Va. Acts 960, 1027 (recodifying “the general laws of
Virginia relating to counties, cities and towns,” including the statue statute at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1270).
135. Act of Mar. 9, 1982, Ch. 19, 1982 Va. Acts 21.
136. Act of Mar. 24, 1988, Ch. 284, 1988 Va. Acts 344.
137. Act of Mar. 20, 1997, Ch. 587, 1997 Va. Acts 976, 1114 (recodifying portions of the code,
including the statue statute as VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812).
138. Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814.
139. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Ch. 390, 2005 Va. Acts 523.
140. Act of Apr. 21, 2010, Ch. 860, 2010 Va. Acts 1821 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-1812). Many of these changes were made to include monuments to subsequent conflicts within
the ambit of the statute, such as including the “World War” after World War I, see Act of Feb. 28,
1930, Ch. 76, 1930 Va. Acts 86, while other changes had a more substantive impact on the kinds of
monuments that might be covered, as is seen below. For the sake of brevity, a substantive discussion of
the majority of the intervening changes is omitted, except where they have relevance to the current
version of the statute or a particular monument conflict.
141. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3.
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removing monuments.142
In its current form, the general Virginia statue statute covers “Confederate
or Union monuments or memorials of the War Between the States” as well as
monuments or memorials to over fourteen additional “war[s] or conflict[s]”
ranging from colonial conflicts in the seventeenth century to Operation Iraqi
Freedom.143 Exactly what counts as a “monument” or “memorial” to one of the
covered conflicts is unclear, but a nonmilitary memorial to the Confederacy
might not be protected. For example, Virginia’s attorney general has suggested
that this language should be read to exclude markers about the historical
significance of buildings, while including only monuments to the conflicts
themselves or veterans of those conflicts.144
As under the original statute, once a covered monument is in place, the
statute prohibits anyone from “disturb[ing] or interfer[ing]” with it; the statute
also prohibits the local government, “or any other person[s],” from “prevent[ing]
its citizens from taking proper measures and exercising proper means for the
protection, preservation and care of” such a monument.145 The present version
of the statute defines “disturb or interfere with” to include removing monuments
as well as acts of physical damage or vandalism.146 The statutory language
“disturb or interfere with” is also specifically defined to cover, in the case of Civil
War monuments, “the placement of Union markings or monuments on
previously designated Confederate memorials” or the reverse in the case of
monuments to the Union.147 Violation of the statute by anyone who “destroys,
defaces, damages,” “removes,” or “breaks down” a covered monument is a
criminal offense punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony depending on the
degree of lost value to the monument in question.148 In addition, anyone who
violates the statute or otherwise “encroache[s] upon” a protected monument
may face a civil action for damages, including attorney’s fees and the potential
for punitive damages.149
Like the original version of Virginia’s statue statute, there are no
restrictions regarding who may erect the covered monument—all monuments
that otherwise meet the descriptive characteristics of the statute will be covered,
so long as they were originally authorized by the local government.150 Unlike the

142. See id. at *3 & nn.35–36 (noting the existence of monument-specific statutes related to
Confederate monuments in the public squares of Amelia, Bedford, Botetourt, Campbell, Greensville,
King and Queen, King William, Mecklenburg, New Kent, Orange, and Rappahannock Counties).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (West 2018).
144. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 15-050 (Aug. 6, 2015), 2015 WL 4850422, at *1–
2.
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. § 18.2-137 (determining misdemeanor or felony punishment depending on whether
the value of or damage to the property is less than $1,000).
149. Id. § 15.2-1812.1. Punitive damages are available for reckless, willful, or wanton violations
of the underlying statue statute, including the willful “unlawful removal” of protected monuments. Id.
150. Id. § 15.2-1812.

26

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

original version of the statute, the current version does not include any
restrictions on the local government agencies that may authorize the creation of
a covered monument or memorial.151 Similarly, and also unlike the original
version of the statute, there are no restrictions on the location of the covered
monument or memorial. Thus, the current statutory language might appear to
protect monuments created with local government approval even if they are not
on public property.152 As Richard Schragger has pointed out, however, the
original version of the statute applied only to monuments erected by county
governments, not city governments,153 and, more particularly, only to
monuments erected in the public square of the county seat.154 In other words,
Virginia’s statue statute does not appear to apply to Confederate monuments
built in cities or by city governments before 1997 and thus does not prevent their
alteration or removal.155
These issues are currently being litigated, and they may well reach
Virginia’s highest court, but to date lower courts in Virginia as well as the state’s
attorney general have adopted the interpretation of the relevant statutory
language that would provide at least some local governments in Virginia with
freedom to move or alter at least some monuments. In Heritage Preservation
Ass’n v. City of Danville,156 a Virginia court held that the expansive changes to
Virginia’s statue statute did not apply retroactively.157 Yet another attempt to
amend the statute—this time in order to make its expanded provisions apply
retroactively—failed in 2016,158 and Virginia’s attorney general recently
endorsed the view of the statute adopted in Heritage Preservation.159
151. Compare id. (providing that “[a] locality may, within the geographical limits of the locality,
authorize and permit the erection of” covered monuments), with Act of Feb. 19, 1904, Ch. 29, 1904 Va.
Acts 62 (referring only to monuments created with the approval of a county’s circuit court and board
of supervisors). This change, expanding the statute to cover any “locality” rather than specific countylevel government actors, was made in the 1997 revisions to the statute. Act of Mar. 20, 1997, Ch. 587,
1997 Va. Acts 976, 1114.
152. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (providing that “[a] locality may, within the
geographical limits of the locality, authorize and permit the erection of” covered monuments), with
Act of Feb. 19, 1904 (referring only to monuments erected in the public squares of county seats). See
also Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3
(discussing the implications of this change). This change—expanding the statute to cover monuments
anywhere within a “locality[’s]” geographic ambit, rather than the locality’s own property—was made
in the 1998 revisions to the statute. Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814.
153. Schragger, Robert E. Lee, supra note 47.
154. Act of Feb. 19, 1904.
155. Amanda Lineberry, Essay, Payne v. City of Charlottesville and the Dillon’s Rule Rationale
for Removal, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 45, 57 (2018).
156. No. CL15000500-00 (Va. Cir. Ct., Dec. 7, 2015) (final order and ruling from the bench). An
appeal of this decision was dismissed in 2016. Elizabeth Tyree, Virginia Supreme Court Again Rejects
Confederate Flag Appeal in Danville, WSET (Oct. 7, 2016), http://wset.com/news/local/virginiasupreme-court-again-rejects-confederate-flag-appeal-in-danville [http://perma.cc/29F5-KPK4].
157. Heritage Pres. Ass’n, slip op. at 2.
158. See 2016 Session: HB 587 Memorials and Monuments; Protection of All Memorials, Etc.,
VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+HB587 [http://perma.cc/
8MEF-UJCQ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018) (providing text, summary, and history of this legislation).
159. Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 3901711, at *3.
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All of this means that the current version of the statute should not apply to
any monuments constructed prior to 1904, the year in which the original version
of the statute was passed. Nor should it apply to monuments that were erected
anywhere other than the “public square” of a county seat prior to the substantive
revisions in the late 1990s.160 Neither the current version of the statute nor any of
the previous versions of the statute define “public square,” but otherwise
unrelated Virginia legislation that predates the 1904 enactment suggests that it
may refer to public land where official county buildings such as a courthouse or
clerk’s office are located.161 Put another way, the current version of the Virginia
statute should be interpreted as protecting only monuments created after 1904,
and for all monuments created between 1904 and 1997 it should protect only
those that were created in the “public square” of a county seat.
B.

Tennessee’s Statue Statute

The Tennessee Heritage Protection Act is an example of the recent crop of
statue statutes that are either titled or frequently referred to as “Heritage
Protection Acts.”162 Unlike Virginia’s statue statute, the original version of
Tennessee’s statue statute only dates back to 2013.163 While the Tennessee
statute does not single out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments, there
can be little doubt that it was motivated primarily by a concern for Confederate
monuments. For example, when the original 2013 version of the statute was
enacted, the Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans hailed it as
“one of the greatest documents in modern history,” in part because it would
“clearly hereafter protect” a number of Confederate monuments, including some
targeted for removal or renaming by local government officials in Memphis.164
The Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans also pointed out
that its own chief of protocol and lieutenant commander wrote and introduced
the bill to the Tennessee House, and its division commander introduced the bill
to the Tennessee Senate.165
In its current form, the Tennessee statute provides that “no memorial
regarding a historic conflict, historic entity, historic event, historic figure, or

160. See id.; Act of Apr. 16, 1998, Ch. 752, 1998 Va. Acts 1814.
161. E.g., Act of Mar. 6, 1890, Ch. 632, 1889–1890 Va. Private Acts 1016; see also Opinion Letter
No. 17-032, 2017 WL 3901711, at *3 n.25 (discussing the possible meaning of “public square” in the
statue statutes).
162. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
163. Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2013, Pub. Ch. No. 75, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts (current
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412).
164. Chuck Demastus, Tennessee Passes Heritage Protection Act (Mailing from the N.B. Forrest
Camp 215 of Memphis and the Tennessee Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans), S. HERITAGE
NEWS & VIEWS (May 11, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://shnv.blogspot.com/2013/05/tennessee-passesheritage-protection-act.html [http://perma.cc/FP6D-AUY7].
165. Id.; see also Liliana Segura, Forrest the Butcher: Memphis Wants To Remove a Statue
Honoring First Grand Wizard of the KKK, INTERCEPT (Sept. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://
theintercept.com/2017/09/02/memphis-wants-to-remove-statue-honoring-kkk-grand-wizard-nathanbedford-forrest/ [http://perma.cc/49TZ-66QY] (quoting Division Chief of Protocol and Lieutenant
Commander Lee Millar, who acknowledged that he was at least “one of the authors” of the statute).
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historic organization that is, or is located on, public property, may be removed,
renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered”
without a waiver from the Tennessee Historical Commission (Tennessee
Commission or Commission).166 Anyone “who can demonstrate . . . aesthetic,
architectural, cultural, economic, environmental, or historic injury” related to the
monument can bring an action for injunctive relief to enforce the statute and
protect covered monuments.167
The Tennessee Commission is a twenty-nine-member board; twenty-four of
its members are gubernatorial appointees, and five are state officials, including
the governor.168 A public entity exercising control of a covered memorial may
petition the Tennessee Commission in writing for a waiver of the statute’s
protections, specifying a “material or substantial need . . . based on historical or
other compelling public interest” and providing publication notice with
identification of potentially interested parties.169 The requisite “material or
substantial need” for a waiver must be demonstrated at the conclusion of a
hearing process before the Commission “by clear and convincing evidence.”170
Under the current version of Tennessee’s statue statute, a waiver must receive a
two-thirds vote of the entire board by a roll call vote.171 This is a change from the
original version of the statute, which allowed a majority of the members of the
Tennessee Commission’s board present at the waiver hearing to grant waivers.172
The current version of the statute also contains an amendment to the original
2013 version that allows virtually anyone aggrieved by the final decision of the
waiver process to seek review of the Commission’s decision in court.173
In addition to the waiver process, the Tennessee statue statute covers an
extremely broad range of monuments. As defined and protected by the
Tennessee statute, “[h]istoric conflict[s]” include the “War Between the States,”
as well as sixteen other conflicts from colonial times to the present, including

166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1), (c) (West 2018).
167. Id. § 4-1-412(d).
168. See id. § 4-11-102(a). The five voting ex officio members contemplated by the statute are
“the governor or the governor’s designee, the state historian, the state archaeologist, the commissioner
of environment and conservation or the commissioner’s designee, and the state librarian and
archivist.” Id.
169. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(2)–(3).
170. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(8)(A).
171. Id. § 4-1-412(c)(8)(B).
172. See Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2013, Pub. Ch. No. 75, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts
(providing, in the since-amended section 4-1-412(d) of the Tennessee Code, that the “commission may
grant a petition for waiver by a majority vote of those present and voting”). At the time that the
statute was amended, opposed state legislators argued that the purpose of the amendment was “to
gum up the works and make it virtually certain that a small minority of people can make it impossible
to [get rid of] a bust of Nathan Bedford Forrest.” See Andy Sher, TN House Passes Bill Making It
Harder To Remove Monuments to Controversial Figures, TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga, Tenn.)
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/politics/state/story/2016/feb/18/tn-house-passesbill-making-it-harder-remove-monuments-controversial-figures/350800/ [http://perma.cc/DX22-N5DR]
(quoting former Tennessee House Democratic Caucus Chair Mike Stewart).
173. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(d).
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“Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada).”174 The statute defines protected “[h]istoric
entit[ies],” “event[s],” “figure[s],” and “organization[s]” broadly, referring to any
token of these categories “recognized as having state, national, military, or
historical significance.”175 Covered “[m]emorial[s]” are defined as any public
property, or almost anything located on public property, which has been erected
for, named for, or dedicated in honor of a covered historic entity, event, figure,
or organization.176
The protection afforded to Confederate memorials by Tennessee’s statue
statute is, in some respects, broader than that provided by some other states. For
example, there are no temporal coverage gaps in Tennessee’s statute, as there
are in other states’ statutes reviewed in this Section.177 But despite the statute’s
apparent breadth, there has been one significant gap in its coverage. Beyond the
waiver process and the broad definitions of covered memorials, the monument
protections in the Tennessee statute are limited to memorials that either
themselves are public property or that are located on public property.178 By
“[p]ublic property,” the statute refers to “all property owned, leased, rented,
managed, or maintained by” any level of state or local government, or by any
other entity created by an act of the state legislature “to perform any public
function.”179
Despite the apparent breadth of this definition of public property, the
statute’s focus on protecting only those monuments that are or are on public
property created an obvious hole in the statute’s coverage. If an otherwisecovered monument ever ceased to be on public property, then it would no longer
be protected by the statute. In other words, a local government that wanted to
get rid of an ostensibly protected monument could do so, so long as it first
conveyed the property on which the monument stands to a sympathetic private
actor, which then could alter or move the monument unburdened by the statute.
In late December 2017 this is exactly what Memphis did for two of its
Confederate monuments. Local groups with an interest in preserving the
monuments swiftly filed suit.180 On May 16, 2018, the Tennessee Chancery Court
issued an order dissolving the plaintiff’s temporary restraining order, dismissing
the plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief, and staying any further sale or transfer of

174. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(2).
175. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(3)–(6).
176. See id. § 4-1-412(a)(7) (defining “Memorial” as “[a]ny public real property or park,
preserve, or reserve,” or “[a]ny statue, monument, memorial, bust, nameplate, historical marker,
plaque, artwork, flag, historic display, school, street, bridge, or building”).
177. See, for example, supra and infra notes 160–161, 205, 214–217 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the temporal gaps in the Virginia and Alabama statue statutes.
178. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public
property, may be removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or
altered.”).
179. Id. § 4-1-412(a)(8).
180. See Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215 v. City of Memphis,
No. 18-29-III (Tenn. Ch. May 16, 2018), appeal filed, No. M2018-01096-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App.
filed June 13, 2018); see also Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119.
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the statues pending the plaintiff’s potential appeal.181 In its order, the court
noted that the governing language from the 2016 version of Tennessee’s statue
statute “does not apply to private property” and “the Statues were located on
and were removed from private property” following the city’s donation of the
land around the monuments to a private entity.182 In response to the city’s
efforts, the Tennessee state legislature voted to strip $250,000 from the state’s
2019 budget that had been earmarked for the Memphis bicentennial.183 Several
state legislators who supported the budgetary cut justified their votes by calling
the city’s careful attempts to comply with the statute “sneaky” and the work
product of “smart lawyers.”184
Perhaps more importantly, in addition to punishing Memphis for its careful
compliance with a poorly drafted statute, the state legislature also revised the
statute, in an attempt to prevent other Tennessee cities from using the same
technique.185 Tennessee’s statue statute now provides that “[n]o memorial or
public property that contains a memorial may be sold, transferred, or otherwise
disposed of by a county, metropolitan government, municipality, or other
political subdivision of this state.”186 This revision to the statute has not faced a
significant test at the time of this writing, but it does appear to restrict future
local governments in Tennessee from exploiting the statute’s “public property”
language in exactly the same way as Memphis. There may, however, still be
opportunities for local governments to use the “public property” language in the
statute to make modifications to how such monuments are displayed. While the
revised statutory language may well prohibit the future sale or transfer of
monuments themselves or of public property that contains a memorial,187 it may
not prohibit, for example, local governments from transferring public property
around or near the memorial to a third party, which could then erect displays or
other materials to change the memorial’s presentation. Such displays might
count as prohibited alterations or disturbances of a memorial that is or is located
on public property without such a transfer.188 But such displays might not count
as prohibited alterations or disturbances if they occur on private property—even

181. Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215, slip op. at 3–4; see also
Ryan Poe, Chancellor: Memphis Confederate Statues Takedown Was Legal, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.) (May 16, 2018, 5:37 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/government/city/
2018/05/16/chancellor-memphis-confederate-statues-takedown-legal/617518002/ [http://perma.cc/6CS23QQ7] (quoting advocates of statue removal who argued that the statue and statute defenders “lost
the Civil War, and . . . just lost this one, too”).
182. Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215, slip op. at 14.
183. Chas Sisk, Tennessee Strips $250,000 from Memphis as Payback for Removing Confederate
Statues, NPR (Apr. 18, 2018, 11:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/04/18/603525897/tennessee-strips250-000-from-memphis-as-payback-for-removing-confederate-statue [http://perma.cc/YB6F-TPGF].
184. Id.
185. Act of May 21, 2018, Pub. Ch. 1033, 2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified as amended at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-1-412).
186. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(2) (West 2018).
187. Id.
188. See id. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public property, may be
removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered.”).
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newly private property—adjacent to the memorial, because the 2018 revisions
merely added additional statutory language regarding the sale or transfer of
property containing monuments,189 rather than addressing the inherent
limitations of the public property provision itself.190
C.

Alabama’s Statue Statute

Alabama’s statue statute, enacted in 2017, is the latest example of the recent
crop of Heritage Protection Acts.191 The Alabama statute purports to protect
“monument[s] which [are] located on public property” as well as “architecturally
significant building[s], memorial building[s], [and] memorial street[s].”192 The
statute defines a “monument” as a “statue, portrait, or marker intended at the
time of dedication to be a permanent memorial to” some “event,” “person,”
“group,” “movement, or military service that is part of the history of the people
or geography now comprising the State of Alabama.”193
Similarly, the statute defines “memorial building,” “memorial school,” and
“memorial street” as anything else that is located on public property and
“erected for, or named or dedicated in honor of,” some “event,” “person,”
“group,” “movement, or military service.”194 It defines “architecturally
significant building[s]” as buildings “located on public property” that meet the
statute’s definition of monument by their “nature, inherent design, or
structure.”195 Last, “public property” is defined broadly as all property owned by
the state, any local government in the state, or “any other entity created by act of
the Legislature to perform any public function.”196 While the Alabama statue
statute does not single out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments (and
there is no historic predecessor statute that does), the timing of the statute’s
passage suggests that it was motivated in large part by a concern for Confederate
monuments. To take just two examples, the bill that became the Alabama statute
was introduced shortly after Confederate flags were ordered removed from
Alabama’s capitol,197 and the statute itself was enacted shortly after New

189. Id. § 4-1-412(b)(2). Other sections of the Tennessee statute prohibit the concealment of
protected memorials for more than forty-five days. Id. § 4-1-412(b)(3)(B). Accordingly, the Tennessee
statute might be read as prohibiting transfers to private actors that result in concealment of the
monuments for longer than this time period, although other efforts to put the monuments in context
on newly private property might be permissible.
190. See id. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (“[N]o memorial . . . that is, or is located on, public property, may be
removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise disturbed or altered.”).
191. Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, Act No. 2017-354, 2017 Ala. Laws (codified
as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 to -237).
192. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a)–(b) (West 2018).
193. Id. § 41-9-231(6).
194. Id. § 41-9-231(3)–(5).
195. Id. § 41-9-231(1).
196. Id. § 41-9-231(7).
197. Rhonda Brownstein, SPLC: Alabama’s Memorial Preservation Act Is About Protecting
Confederate Monuments, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (May 25, 2017), http://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/05/
25/splc-alabamas-memorial-preservation-act-about-protecting-confederate-monuments [http://perma.
cc/G3BU-RRKM].
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Orleans removed several of its own Confederate monuments.198
Protected monuments, buildings, and memorials fall into different
classifications under the Alabama statue statute. Those that are “located on
public property” and have been “so situated for 40 or more years” may not be
“relocated, removed, altered, renamed, or otherwise disturbed,” full stop.199
Those that are located on public property and have been “so situated for at least
20 years, and less than 40 years” may be relocated or altered, but only after the
local government in question wins approval from the Committee on Alabama
Monument Protection (Alabama Committee or Committee).200
The Alabama Committee is made up of four members of the Alabama state
legislature, three local government officials appointed by the governor, and four
additional at-large appointees.201 If a local government wishes to relocate or
otherwise disturb a protected monument, building, or memorial that has been in
place for more than twenty but less than forty years, it must petition the
Alabama Committee for a waiver of the statue statute’s restrictions, which the
Committee can then either grant or deny.202 If any “entity exercising control of
public property” protected by the statute has “disturbed” the monument at issue
without first obtaining a waiver from the Alabama Committee, then the statute
directs the Alabama attorney general to collect a fine of $25,000 for each such
violation.203
Despite the onerous nature of the Committee’s review process and the stiff
financial penalties provided for those who disturb ostensibly protected
monuments, the protections provided by Alabama’s statue statute are among the
198. Derek Cosson, Alabama Gov. Signs Law Protecting Confederate Monuments, PULSE (May
25,
2017),
http://pulsegulfcoast.com/2017/05/alabama-gov-signs-law-protecting-confederatemonuments [http://perma.cc/FJ99-CFHA]. National and local coverage of the statute’s passage
focused almost exclusively on the statute’s impact on Confederate monuments. See, e.g., Brandon
Moseley, Legislature Passes Confederate Monuments Preservation Bill, ALA. POL. REP. (May 20,
2017), http://www.alreporter.com/2017/05/20/legislature-passes-confederate-monuments-preservationbill/ [http://perma.cc/8EPM-EDJE]; Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate
Monuments Are Here To Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/
alabama-confederate-monuments-bill-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/T2MG-Y7BY].
199. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a).
200. Id. §§ 41-9-232(b), -235. Similarly, memorial schools located on public property for more
than twenty years, as those terms are defined by the statute, may only be renamed pursuant to the
approval of the Alabama Committee. Id. §§ 41-9-232(c), -235.
201. Id. § 41-9-234(a)–(b). The four committee members from the Alabama legislature are to be
split between the state House of Representatives and Senate, and between the majority and minority
parties. Id. § 41-9-234(b)(1)–(2). Two of the additional at-large appointments are made by the
governor, one by the speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives, and one by the president pro
tempore of the Alabama Senate. Id. § 41-9-234(b)(3)–(5). Unlike similar commissions for other state
statue statutes, the Alabama statute contemplates that a list of potential nominees be submitted for
these at-large appointees by a number of state historical groups, including the Black Heritage Council.
Id. § 41-9-234(c).
202. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(1). If the Alabama Committee fails to address the waiver petition within
ninety days, it is deemed granted. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(c).
203. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(d). The same penalty applies to any local government entity exercising
control over a protected monument that fails to comply with any conditions and instructions issued by
the Alabama Committee after granting a waiver. Id.
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most threadbare of all of the statutes reviewed here. First, the statute is entirely
silent with respect to monuments, buildings, or memorials that have been in
place on public property for less than twenty years.204 This is the most obvious of
the many gaps in the Alabama statute’s protections, but it is also the least
significant: only six Confederate monuments in Alabama have been in place on
public property for less than twenty years prior to the statute’s passage.205
More importantly, like the statue statutes in Tennessee and other states,206
the Alabama statute is silent with respect to otherwise covered monuments,
buildings, or memorials that are not located on “public property.”207 Indeed,
another provision in the Alabama statue statute makes this public property
coverage gap potentially even more significant than in states like Tennessee,
because Alabama’s statue statute also contains a specific exception for
otherwise-protected “[a]rt and artifacts in the collections of museums, archives,
and libraries.”208 This suggests that if a local government entity donates the
public property on which an otherwise-protected monument sits to a private
entity, and that private entity then conveys the monument to a museum, archive,
or library—undefined in the statute—then the once-protected monument would
be doubly removed from the statute’s ostensible protections.209
As significant as this public property gap may be for local governments in
Alabama that wish to remove or modify ostensibly protected Confederate
monuments, an additional opportunity for local action under the statute may
prove equally or even more significant. It is easiest to see this opportunity as the
product of three related classifications and procedural decisions made in the
statute. First, the statute does not provide for any penalties for anyone who
disturbs statues that have been protected for more than forty years.210 Second,
there is no referral and waiver process to the Alabama Committee for such
monuments—the referral and waiver process only applies to monuments that
have been in place for twenty to forty years.211 Third, the penalties in the statute
all relate to violations of decisions by or failures to obtain waivers from the
Committee.212 More specifically, the penalties contemplated by the statute are to
be imposed upon any local government entity that disturbs a protected
monument “without first obtaining a waiver from the committee as required by
204. See id. § 41-9-232.
205. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 64, at 17–18.
206. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (West 2018).
207. ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a).
208. Id. § 41-9-236(1).
209. In addition to this exception for art and artifacts in museums, archives, and libraries,
section 41-9-236 also contains a number of additional exceptions. Id. § 41-9-236. But these additional
exceptions have not been discussed at greater length here because they deal with otherwise-covered
monuments that might interfere with public transportation, utility service, or port services. Id. Local
governments might argue that almost any otherwise-covered monument interferes with public
transportation or utility services, but not all such arguments would be of equal merit or could be made
in good faith.
210. Id.
211. See id. § 41-9-235(a)(1) (referring to id. § 41-9-232(b)–(c)).
212. Id. § 41-9-235(a)(2)(d).
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this article” or which “fail[s] to comply with the conditions and instructions
issued” along with a waiver.213
But because the statute only contemplates waiver applications for
otherwise-covered monuments, buildings, and memorials that have been in place
for twenty to forty years, local governments that modify monuments that have
been in place for more than forty years face no penalty—at least, there is no
penalty provided by the statute. This is because, under the statute, there is no
procedure established for them to engage with the Alabama Committee. Thus,
for monuments of this age, there is no way for local governments to trigger the
statute’s penalties by violating either the waiver process or a decision of the
Committee about a waiver application.214 To sum up, in the words of one
associate city attorney and Alabama state legislator who voted against the statue
statute, this gap in coverage renders the statute “essentially unenforceable,” at
least when it comes to monuments that are more than forty years old.215 As
noted earlier, this coverage gap is the subject of a challenge by the City of
Birmingham that is ongoing as of the time of this writing,216 and private groups
and other local governments in Alabama are considering making similar
challenges.217
D.

Georgia’s Statue Statute

Georgia’s statue statute is one small piece of a larger series of code sections,
which primarily focus on Georgia’s state flag and date back over a century.218
The monument protection language was added in 2001,219 as part of an
attempted compromise to resolve a long-simmering conflict over Georgia’s state
flag, which had long incorporated Confederate designs and symbols.220 But the

213. Id.
214. Id. § 41-9-235.
215. Paul Gattis, Alabama Monuments Law Flawed, $25K Fine Doesn’t Apply, Lawmaker Says,
(Aug.
19,
2017),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/08/alabama_
AL.COM
monuments_law_flawed_2.html
[http://perma.cc/U53V-2AH5]
(quoting
Alabama
State
Representative and Tuscaloosa Associate City Attorney Chris England). Representative England also
opined that the statue statute is a “bad law” not only because the “spirit of the [statue statute] is
horrible” and because it is “impractical” but also because “it was poorly drafted” and that successful
legal challenges to the statute will likely show “just how bad the law is.” Id.
216. See infra note 317 and accompanying text; see also Gladney, supra note 116.
217. E.g., Kyle Gassiott, State of Alabama Fights Local Community over Confederate Statue,
MARKETPLACE (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:58 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/2018/03/14/life/lawsuit-overprotest-confederate-statue-alabama-heads-court [http://perma.cc/RH5X-UEQX].
218. Act of Aug. 21, 1916, No. 565, § 3(61), 1916 Ga. Laws 158, 178. The current version of
Georgia’s statue statute, which reflects all subsequent amendments, is codified at GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-3-1. The portion of the current statute dealing with the state flag is section 50-3-1(a), whereas the
monument protection language begins at section 50-3-1(b). For a thoughtful analysis of the history of
the state statutory treatment of Georgia’s flag and how the monument protection language came to be
added to this section of the Georgia Code, see generally Darren Summerville, New State Flag, 18 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2001).
219. Act of Jan. 31, 2001, No. 1, § 1, 2001 Ga. Laws 1, 1–2.
220. See, e.g., Dan Collins, Georgia Finally Unfurls New Flag, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2003, 3:57
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgia-finally-unfurls-new-flag/ [http://perma.cc/2AWQ-GW7D]
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compromise that gave rise to the monument protection language in this statute
was short-lived.221 Two years after the 2001 amendments that both added
monument protection language and reworked the state flag to minimize
Confederate design aspects, a 2003 bill changed the state flag design back to a
design based on the Confederate national flag.222
In addition, the 2001 legislation that created Georgia’s general statue
statute also included a section that specifically singled out Stone Mountain,223 a
massive state-owned Confederate memorial and Ku Klux Klan rally site often
referred to as the Confederate Mount Rushmore.224 The Stone Mountain
protection statute provides, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,
that “the memorial to the heroes of the Confederate States of America graven
upon the face” of the mountain “shall be preserved and protected for all time as
a tribute to the bravery and heroism of the citizens of this state who suffered and
died in their cause.”225
In its current form, the general Georgia statue statute protects all “publicly
owned monument[s], plaque[s], marker[s], or memorial[s]” that are associated
with the military service of anyone associated with the United States of America,
the Confederate States of America, Georgia, or any other state, whether part of
the Confederacy or the Union.226 Such protected monuments may not be
“relocated, removed, concealed, obscured, or altered in any fashion,” save for
“appropriate measures” connected with “preservation, protection, and
interpretation.”227 The statute also provides that any person or entity who
“mutilate[s], deface[s], defile[s], or abuse[s] contemptuously any publicly owned
monument, plaque, marker, or memorial” has committed a misdemeanor.228
Similarly, the statute prohibits any state or local government agency, or any
state or local government official, from “remov[ing] or conceal[ing]” any such
monument “for the purpose of preventing the visible display of the same,” again
subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor.229 In addition, the statute protects
privately owned and protected monuments against any person or entity acting
without authority who takes any of the long list of prohibited actions listed

(noting that the state flag created in 2001 “was a compromise intended to shrink the Confederate
emblem but incorporate the symbol in a mini-montage of old Georgia flags”).
221. See id.
222. Act of May 8, 2003, No. 4, 2003 Ga. Laws 26 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 503-1).
223. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(c) (West 2018).
224. See, e.g., Planned MLK Tribute on “Confederate Mount Rushmore” Stirs Controversy, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/martin-luther-king-jr-tribute-georgiastone-mountain-controversy-confederate-memorial/ [http://perma.cc/3VXB-FBGA].
225. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(c). In the following discussion I refer to the “general” Georgia
statue statute, by which I intend to exclude the provisions of the statute that are specific to Stone
Mountain.
226. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(1).
227. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(2).
228. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(1).
229. Id.
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elsewhere in the statute.230 Furthermore, the statute provides that any person or
entity aggrieved by any unauthorized damage, denigration, or relocation of a
protected privately owned monument may bring damages against the person or
entity, acting without authorization, who tampered with that monument.231
As with the Tennessee and Alabama statue statutes, the Georgia statute’s
protections are limited to those monuments that are “publicly owned.”232 This
means that local governments in Georgia that wish to remove or alter
Confederate monuments in public civic places may be able to do so if they first
convey the property on which the monument stands to a sympathetic private
actor. Beyond the public property carve-out, the provisions of Georgia’s statute
that allow local governments to take “appropriate measures” connected with the
“interpretation” of a protected monument233 should allow some local
governments to minimize some of the longstanding negative impacts of
Confederate monuments in public civic spaces. More specifically, this
“interpretation” carve-out should allow local governments to erect plaques and
other monuments or provide interpretative tools to demonstrate that
communities now reject the messages that accompanied the monuments when
they were first erected.
E.

North Carolina’s Statue Statute

North Carolina’s statue statute, enacted in 2015, is another example from
the recent crop of statutes often referred to as Heritage Protection Acts.234 The
North Carolina statute applies to “object[s] of remembrance located on public
property,” and it broadly defines “object[s] of remembrance” as any
“monument, memorial, plaque, statue, marker, or display of a permanent
character that commemorates an event, a person, or military service that is part
of North Carolina’s history.”235 While the North Carolina statute does not single
out the Confederacy or Confederate monuments, and there is no predecessor
statute that does so, the timing of the statute’s passage suggests that it was
motivated primarily by a concern for Confederate monuments, as other scholars
have previously noted.236

230. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(4).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 50-3-1(b)(2).
233. Id.
234. Cultural History Artifact Management and Patriotism Act of 2015, Sess. Law 2015-170,
2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 435 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.).
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 100-2.1(b) (West 2018).
236. See, e.g., Alfred Brophy, North Carolina Heritage Protection Act, FAC. LOUNGE (July 16,
2015, 12:14 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/07/north-carolina-heritage-protection-act.html
[http://perma.cc/WR48-ATJF] (“[O]bviously [the bill] is about Confederate Monuments—no one’s
taking down Vietnam or WWII monuments.”). For a more concrete example of the statute’s
connection with Confederate monuments, a thoughtful student comment points out that the North
Carolina statue statute was enacted just two weeks after South Carolina removed the Confederate
battle flag from its state capitol. Kasi E. Wahlers, Comment, North Carolina’s Heritage Protection Act:
Cementing Confederate Monuments in North Carolina’s Landscape, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2176, 2180 (2016).
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Under North Carolina’s statue statute, protected “object[s] of
remembrance” may not be permanently removed.237 Protected monuments may
be “relocated” on a temporary or permanent basis, but such a relocation is
subject to a number of restrictions.238 First, temporarily relocated objects of
remembrance must be returned to their original site within ninety days.239
Second, permanently relocated objects of remembrance must be relocated to
sites of “similar prominence, honor, visibility, availability, and access that are
within the boundaries of the jurisdiction from which [they were] relocated.”240
More specifically, objects of remembrance may not be permanently relocated to
museums, cemeteries, or mausoleums unless they were originally located at such
a site.241
Despite the apparent breadth of the North Carolina statute and the
specificity of the restrictions it imposes on relocating protected monuments,
substantial opportunities exist for local governments in North Carolina that wish
to alter or remove Confederate monuments. North Carolina’s statue statute,
much like the statutes in Tennessee and some other states, only protects
monuments on public property.242 As a result, if an otherwise-covered
monument ever ceases to be on public property, it would presumably no longer
be protected by the statute. In other words, in North Carolina, as in other states,
a local government that wants to get rid of a Confederate monument might be
able to do so, provided that it first conveys the property on which the monument
stands to a friendly private actor.
F.

Mississippi’s Statue Statute

Mississippi’s statue statute dates to 2004.243 It purports to protect “statues,
monuments, memorials[,] or nameplates” that “have been erected on public
property of the state or any of its political subdivisions” and that relate to
historic military figures, events, organizations, or units from a number of past
conflicts.244 In addition to statues, monuments, memorials, nameplates, and
plaques, the statute covers almost any object that could be named after military

237. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 100-2.1(b).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 100-2.1(b) (noting that “[a]n object of remembrance
located on public property may not be permanently removed and may only be relocated . . . under the
circumstances listed in this subsection” (emphasis added)), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1)
(West 2018) (referring to “memorial[s] . . . that [are], or [are] located on, public property”). Unlike the
Tennessee statute, the North Carolina statute does not define “public property.” See N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 100-2.1(b).
243. Mississippi Military Memorial Protection Act, Ch. 463, 2004 Miss. Laws 496 (codified as
amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-15-81).
244. MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-15-81(1) (West 2018). The full list of military conflicts covered by
the statute includes the “Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican-American War, War Between the
States, Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf
War, War in Iraq [and] Native American War[].” Id.
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figures, events, or organizations from the covered conflicts—everything from
schools, streets, parks, bridges, and buildings would fall within the statute’s ambit
if so named.245
Under Mississippi’s statue statute, all protected monuments, public
property, or public areas may not be “relocated, removed, disturbed, altered,
renamed[,] or rededicated,” period.246 Moreover, “[n]o person may prevent the
public body responsible for maintaining” a protected monument “from taking
proper measures and exercising proper means” to preserve, protect, care, repair,
or restore the monument.247 Unlike the statue statutes in some other states, there
is no state commission for waiver of either of these restrictions nor is there a
particular provision for revisiting the protection of the statute by the state
legislature for specific monuments. Instead, the Mississippi statute expressly
provides that the “governing body” responsible for the monument—which
conceivably could be either the state or local government agency that directly
maintains the monument, or the state or local government agency that maintains
the property on which the monument is located if the monument is owned by a
group like the United Daughters of the Confederacy—may determine that an
alternative “location is more appropriate to displaying the monument” and “may
move the memorial” to that alternative and “more suitable location.”248 In other
words, the facial language of the Mississippi statute is more flexible than that of
other statue statutes.
This immediately apparent gap in the protections ostensibly afforded to
qualifying monuments makes the Mississippi statue statute potentially one of the
weakest, despite the apparent breadth of the statute’s protections. If local
governments may simply choose to move protected monuments to a location
that they deem “more suitable,”249 then although the statute may save such
monuments from destruction, it does nothing to prevent local governments from
moving such monuments to less prominent locations, or to locations where they
can be placed in historical context and used as tools for education or
reconciliation rather than as monuments to discrimination and intimidation.
Underscoring the relative freedom that Mississippi local governments enjoy to
move protected monuments, Mississippi’s attorney general recently weighed in
on this specific statutory provision, writing that monuments can be moved within
a county or municipality250 and that such a decision is a discretionary one that
can only be made by the relevant local government.251

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. § 55-15-81(2).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Miss. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 2017-00275 (Oct. 2, 2017), 2017 WL 5558441,
at *2 (confirming that, under section 55-15-81(2), a protected monument may be “‘moved’ within the
county jurisdictional limits to some other more suitable location on county property” once the
county’s board of commissioners makes a finding that the alternative “location is more appropriate for
displaying the monument”).
251. Miss. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 2017-00288 (Oct. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 5558444,
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In addition to this gap in the statute’s ostensible protection, there are no
penalties for violating any of its provisions. Although the state legislature has
attempted to amend the statute and include penalties on multiple occasions,
none of these attempts has succeeded to date.252
G.

Kentucky’s Statue Statute

Kentucky’s statue statute,253 which was invoked during litigation over the
Louisville-Brandenburg monument discussed in the introduction,254 dates to
2002.255 Like the Mississippi statute, the text of the Kentucky statute imposes
relatively weak restrictions on local governments, especially given the
interpretation of the Kentucky statute by the relevant state regulations.
Moreover, the Kentucky statute has proved relatively weak in practice, as local
governments in both Louisville and Lexington have been able to move
prominent and controversial Confederate monuments more easily than local
governments in other states.256
Kentucky’s statue statute forbids the alteration, destruction, removal, or
transfer “of a site designated as a military heritage site” without either the
written approval of the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission (Kentucky
Commission or Commission)257 or the Commission’s rescission of the
designation of the monument as a covered site.258 Military activities “engaged in
by the Confederate States of America” are expressly included in the statute’s
long list of what qualifies as “[m]ilitary heritage” under the statute.259 However,
military heritage sites that meet the statute’s qualifications must be approved by
the Kentucky Commission. In other words, without the Commission’s approval,

at *2 (confirming that any decision as to the “suitability” of a new or alternative location for an
otherwise-protected monument under the statute “is a factual determination which can only be made
by the municipal governing authority,” provided that the statue “remain[s] on public property for
display” within the county or municipality where it was originally located).
252. E.g., H.B. 969, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018) (attempting to impose a fine of $10,000
plus all costs associated with restoring or relocating the protected monument, as well as a six-month
jail term, in a bill that died in committee); H.B. 1268, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017) (attempting to
impose the same fines and potential jail terms in a bill that would have taken effect July 2017).
253. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788 (West 2018).
254. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div. v. Louisville Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, No. 16CI-2009, slip op. at 5 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2016).
255. Kentucky Military Heritage Act, Ch. 40, § 1, 2002 Ky. Acts 299, 299 (codified as amended
at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788).
256. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div., slip op. at 7 (denying motion to enjoin the
county government from relocating a Confederate monument and granting motions to dissolve a
previously granted restraining order and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice); Morgan Eads et al.,
In a Surprise Move, Lexington Removes Controversial Confederate Statues, HERALD-LEADER
(Lexington, Ky.) (October 17, 2017, 6:46 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/counties/fayettecounty/article179392076.html [http://perma.cc/85JA-BKT2] (noting that an opinion provided by
Kentucky’s attorney general “opened the door for the city to begin the removal of the statues”).
257. The Kentucky Military Heritage Commission was also established by the statue statute.
Kentucky Military Heritage Act, § 2 (current version at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.782).
258. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.788(2).
259. Id.
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even if a monument might be eligible for protection under the statute, it is not
protected by the statute. Violation of the statute is punishable as a misdemeanor
for the first offense and a felony for each subsequent offense.260
One key opportunity for local action under Kentucky’s statue statute relates
to its unique registration process. More specifically, the statute only protects
monuments approved as significant military heritage sites and designated as
protected monuments by the Kentucky Commission.261 But very few of the
monuments in the state that might qualify as protected military heritage sites
have been through this application and registration process. Fewer than thirty of
the more than two hundred sites or objects that might qualify, including many of
the state’s most prominently displayed Confederate monuments, have ever been
submitted to the Commission for consideration.262 Indeed, it was just such a
failure to designate the Louisville monument considered in this Article’s
Introduction that undercut the Kentucky Sons of Confederate Veterans’ attempt
to prevent its removal.263 As Kentucky’s attorney general recently suggested, the
Kentucky Commission has designated few monuments for protection because
the application process for monument designation is quite complicated.264
H.

South Carolina’s Statue Statute

Like many other statue statutes, the monument protection portions of the
South Carolina Code do not single out the Confederacy.265 Unlike many other
state statue statutes, the South Carolina statute has been invoked by those who
wish to preserve memorials to conflicts besides the Civil War,266 but only to
protect the alteration of racially segregated memorials to other conflicts besides
the Civil War.267 This tends to underscore rather than undermine the links
between South Carolina’s statue statute, the monuments it protects, and the
state’s history of institutionalized discrimination.
Moreover, as in other states, the centrality of Confederate monuments to

260. Id. § 171.788(1)–(2).
261. Id. § 171.782(3).
262. Peter Brackney, Two Statues, a Military Heritage Commission, and the Telling of History,
KAINTUCKEEAN (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.kaintuckeean.com/2017/08/relocating-breckinridge-andmorgan-statues.html [http://perma.cc/Z2DR-726C].
263. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div. v. Louisville Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, No. 16CI-2009, slip op. at 7–8 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2016).
264. See Ky. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-023 (Oct. 17, 2017), 2017 WL 4843705
(citing 202 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030).
265. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A) (West 2018) (protecting “monuments or memorials”
commemorating the “Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican War, War Between the States,
Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War,” and “Persian Gulf
War,” as well as “Native American[] or African-American History”).
266. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, Change to a Segregated Monument Is Stymied by a Law Protecting
It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1GLaFGm [http://perma.cc/7PCB-BYSQ] (noting that
South Carolina’s statue statute has been invoked to prevent the town of Greenwood from modifying a
monument to World War I and World War II that lists fallen soldiers in separate categories for
“white” and “colored”).
267. Id.
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the statute is revealed by its history. More specifically, South Carolina’s statue
statute was passed in 2000268 as part of a legislative compromise that removed
the Confederate battle flag from atop the state capitol building while providing
for its retention elsewhere on the capitol grounds.269 Accordingly, like the other
statue statutes that were passed as parts of bills related to the display of the
Confederate flag or the incorporation of Confederate imagery in state flag
designs, the legislative history of the South Carolina statute strongly suggests
that the bill was passed with the protection of Confederate monuments
particularly in mind.270 Moreover, as in the other states examined here, the
overwhelming majority of conflicts over protected monuments in South Carolina
have been over Confederate monuments.271
As noted above, the South Carolina statute covers “monuments or
memorials,” terms not otherwise defined, and it covers many conflicts and
periods of history in addition to the Civil War and the Confederacy.272 Under the
statute, monuments or memorials related to covered conflicts or periods in
history “erected on public property of the State or any of its political
subdivisions” may not be “relocated, removed, disturbed, or altered.”273
Similarly, no one may interfere with any “public body responsible for the
monument or memorial” by preventing it “from taking proper measures and
exercising proper means” (also undefined) for the “protection, preservation, and
care” of protected monuments.274
South Carolina’s attorney general has interpreted the term “public body” in
the statute to include nonprofit groups such as the United Daughters of
Confederacy and the Sons of Confederate Veterans.275 If this interpretation is
adopted by South Carolina courts, then it might mean that private groups’
maintenance of protected monuments would be immune from interference from
both local governments and potentially state agencies, which might wish to alter
or remove the monuments. Such an interpretation would make South Carolina’s

268. Act of May 23, 2000, No. 292, § 3, 2000 S.C. Acts 2069, 2071 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-165).
269. See id. §§ 1–2 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN.) (addressing
issues related to flags at the South Carolina capitol).
270. For example, in an unusual provision highlighting the centrality of South Carolina’s
Confederate heritage to the 2000 legislation that created the statue statute, the provisions of the bill
related to the display of the Confederate flag on and around the state capitol expressly preserved the
rights of individuals “on the capitol complex grounds” to “wear[] as a part of [their] clothing or carry[]
or display[] any type of flag including a Confederate Flag.” Id. § 1.
271. See, e.g., Nathaniel Cary, S.C. Confederate Monuments in Spotlight as Some Call for
Change, GREENVILLE NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017, 7:57 PM), http://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/
2017/08/16/s-c-confederate-monuments-spotlight-some-call-change/574806001/ [http://perma.cc/F64XM97G] (quoting legislators of both parties regarding the centrality of Confederate monuments to
South Carolina’s state statue statute).
272. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A) (West 2018).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. S.C. Attorney General, Opinion Letter to Rep. Charles R. Sharpe (July 18, 2001), 2001 WL
957759, at *3.
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statute more restrictive than other states for local governments that wish to alter
or remove Confederate monuments.
Unlike some other statutes, the South Carolina statute does not create or
contemplate a state commission to hear petitions for waivers. Rather, the only
possibility for waiver or modification of the monument protections is by a
subsequent two-thirds vote of the state legislature.276 This makes South
Carolina’s statute substantially more restrictive than other states, especially
when one considers the pronounced rural-urban split in support for Confederate
monuments.277 Convincing two-thirds of the state legislators in South Carolina to
agree to modify a monument that is not in their district, and which therefore
faces no relevant local opposition, would likely prove far more difficult than
convincing a majority or even two-thirds of a bipartisan historical commission to
grant a waiver.278 Again, this aspect of South Carolina’s statute makes it more
restrictive than other states for local governments that wish to alter or remove
Confederate monuments.
Although the waiver process set forth by South Carolina’s statue statute is
even more onerous than the waiver process in other states, there is some
language in South Carolina’s statute that could be construed as protecting only
those monuments that either themselves are “public property” or are located on
“public property.”279 As with several other statutes, this language might be
interpreted to mean that local governments in South Carolina that wish to move
or alter Confederate monuments in public civic places might be able to do so, as
s’s Novel Strategy for Tearing Down Confederate Statues, Atlantic (Dec a
actor.
On the other hand, the relevant language from the South Carolina statute
refers to all monuments “erected on public property.”280 In contrast to the
language in other states’ statutes, this language could be interpreted as providing
more protection to Confederate monuments than analogous language from other
statue statutes that only protect monuments that are publicly owned or located
on public property.281 More specifically, unlike the language of many other
statue statutes, the relevant language from the South Carolina statute might be
interpreted as protecting all monuments that were originally erected on public
property, even if they subsequently became private property or were moved to

276. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(B).
277. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., supra notes 168–173, 200–203 and accompanying text (discussing Tennessee’s and
Alabama’s historical commissions).
279. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A) (protecting “memorials erected on public property of
the State or any of its political subdivisions”).
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for a description of this issue, comparing section
10-1-165(A) of the South Carolina Code with the relevant language from Tennessee’s statue statute,
which refers to monuments “located” on public property. See also ALA. CODE § 41-9-231(6) (West
2018) (protecting monuments “located” on public property or “publicly owned” rather than all those
that may have been “erected” on public property (emphases added)); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1002.1(b) (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN § 50-3-1(b)(2) (West 2018).
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private property.282 Such an interpretation of South Carolina’s statute would, of
course, minimize the “public property” opportunity to alter or remove
Confederate monuments that is or has been available to local governments
under the Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee statutes.283
South Carolina’s statute also provides fewer opportunities than other
statutes for local governments to modify or remove at least some Confederate
monuments based on their age. For example, unlike Virginia’s statute, South
Carolina’s statute has not been modified since it was passed in 2000, which
means that the sort of temporal gap in protection created by Virginia’s oftmodified statute does not exist in South Carolina. Nor was South Carolina’s
statute drafted with the sorts of temporal categories seen in other states, which
provide local governments with the opportunity to alter or remove some
monuments based on the monuments’ ages.284
In other words, South Carolina’s statue statute may be one of the most
restrictive and least vulnerable examples of its kind—at least to the sorts of
arguments discussed in Section II of this Article. Least vulnerable does not,
however, mean invulnerable. Recall that South Carolina’s statue statute was
passed as part of a response to controversies over the Confederate battle flag
and Confederate monuments at and around the state capitol grounds.285 Indeed,
most of the provisions of this 2000 legislation apply to specific Confederate
monuments or Confederate flags in or around the South Carolina state capitol,
unlike South Carolina’s general-purpose statue statute. For example, section 1 of
the 2000 legislation refers to the flags authorized to be flown or hung atop the
dome of the state capitol and in the state legislature’s chambers, while sections 5
and 6 deal with the permanent display in the South Carolina State Museum of
the Confederate flags that previously flew or hung in these locations.286 As a
result, the legislation as enacted created new statutory sections across different
chapters and even different titles of the South Carolina Code.287
282. Unlike the Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee statue statutes, but like
South Carolina’s statute, Virginia’s statute may be subject to a similarly restrictive interpretation,
because the relevant statutory language does not refer to public property, but rather forbids any
disturbance or interference “with any monuments or memorials . . . erected” within a “locality.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (West 2018) (emphasis added). Similarly, Mississippi’s statute protects
monuments that “have been erected on public property of the state or any of its political subdivisions.”
MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-15-81(1) (West 2018) (emphasis added).
However, as discussed above and below, local governments in Mississippi and Virginia have
multiple additional opportunities to alter or remove Confederate monuments that are not present
under the South Carolina statute. See supra Parts II.A and II.F.
283. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A).
284. Id. § 10-1-165. See also supra notes 205, 210–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these opportunities for local governments under Alabama’s statue statute.
285. See supra notes 268–270 and accompanying text for a discussion of the events leading to
the passage of this legislation.
286. Act of May 23, 2000, No. 292, §§ 1, 5–6, 2000 S.C. Acts 2069, 2070, 2072 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN.).
287. Most of the statute was codified in title 10, which deals with public buildings and property.
South Carolina’s statue statute, created by section 3 of the 2000 legislation, can be found in chapter 1
of title 10 of the South Carolina Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165. But the 2000 Act placed some of
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Some of the pieces of the 2000 legislation do refer expressly to penalties.
For example, the legislation provides that anyone who “wilfully and maliciously”
defaces, vandalizes, damages, destroys, or attempts the same to any monument
or flag “located on the capitol grounds” shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.288 But
this provision of the 2000 legislation does not reach monuments located
elsewhere throughout the state. Moreover, as noted above, it is codified in a
different chapter of the South Carolina Code than the statue statute.
By contrast, the statue statute provisions that apply generally across the
state contain no reference to any penalty.289 Nor is there any general provision
for penalties in title 10, chapter 1 of the South Carolina Code—the title and
chapter in which the statue statute is located—although other provisions of
chapter 1 do contain specific penalties for their violation, including those
sections that deal with recovering the costs of removal and storage for
unauthorized parking in state-owned facilities.290 In other words, like the
Mississippi statute and part of the Alabama statute, it is unclear what penalty
attaches to a violation of South Carolina’s statute, and the most appropriate
answer, given the statute’s structure, might well be no penalty at all. In sum,
there are at least some opportunities to challenge the South Carolina statute in
its current form, and the absence of clearly defined penalties should give those
local governments inclined to do something about public Confederate
monuments some encouragement to do so.
***
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, statue statutes are not impossible
barriers for local governments to overcome. Rather, each statute provides at
least some opportunity for local governments to address the monumental legacy
of institutionalized racism and violence in their public spaces, although some
statutes provide more opportunities to local governments than others. Exploiting
these opportunities is not the optimal solution—it would be better for
legislatures or courts to get rid of these statutes altogether—but so long as the
statutes remain in something like their current forms, local governments that
wish to challenge them should not be discouraged from doing so by the statutes’
unearned reputation.
III. BEYOND REPAIR: WHY COURTS AND LEGISLATURES SHOULD REJECT
ATTEMPTS TO REVISE STATUE STATUTES THAT WOULD TAKE AWAY
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
Reviewing the history and terms of the statue statutes reveals that they are

the provisions dealing with flags and monuments on or around the state capitol grounds in chapter 11
of title 10 of the South Carolina Code, while others are located in title 1 of the South Carolina Code,
which deals with the administration of the state government. Act of May 23, 2000.
288. Act of May 23, 2000, § 8 (emphasis added) (citing penalties provided in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10-11-360).
289. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165.
290. E.g., id. § 10-1-200(3).
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deeply flawed—primarily in terms of their purpose in attempting to protect
monuments that enshrine entrenched patterns of discrimination, but also in
terms of their practical effect. Many local governments subject to these statutes
should have opportunities to alter or remove existing Confederate monuments.
But it would be optimistic to assume that merely identifying opportunities for
local government action under the statutes in their current form will signify the
end of protected monuments without further conflict.
For example, although some state attorneys general have acted to limit the
interpretation or application of existing statue statutes,291 others have provided
and will continue to provide guidance urging the broadest possible interpretation
of the statutes.292 If adopted by courts, these broad interpretations of the statutes
will minimize the opportunities for monument modification or removal available
to local governments. Moreover, some officials or private individuals with
standing under the relevant statutes who wish to protect the continued existence
or present location of monuments covered by statue statutes can be expected to
file administrative appeals or to litigate.293 They also may argue that some of the
coverage gaps identified above should be minimized or read out of the statute
altogether.294 Indeed, this has already begun to occur.295
In other states, defenders of statue statutes may use legislation, rather than
litigation, to patch the coverage gaps identified in this Article and provide more
effective protection for Confederate monuments on public property. Such
legislative fixes can be expected to take one of two forms.
First, some state legislators who wish to preserve Confederate monuments
and rehabilitate existing statue statutes may try to close off some of the
opportunities for local action that exist in the current statutes while preserving
much of the current statutes’ form and structure. As the Tennessee legislature’s
response to the removal of Confederate monuments shows, this also has already
begun to occur296—after all, a history of frequent legislative patchwork is one of

291. See, e.g., Va. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 17-032 (Aug. 25, 2017), 2017 WL
3901711, at *3 (noting some of the time and location limitations on Virginia’s statue statute outlined in
this Article); see also Eads et al., supra note 256 (noting that the Kentucky attorney general’s opinion
relevant to the Lexington monuments, Opinion Letter No. 17-023, 2017 WL 4843705 (Oct. 17, 2017),
“opened the door for the city to begin removal of the statues”).
292. See, e.g., Miss. Attorney General, Opinion Letter No. 2017-00275 (Oct. 2, 2017), 2017 WL
5558441, at *2–3 (concluding that the ambiguity between the Mississippi statute’s monument removal
and monument protection provisions should be resolved by allowing local governments to remove or
relocate monuments only within their own jurisdiction).
293. See, e.g., Hartley & Ley, supra note 115 (noting that the Charlottesville monument dispute
is likely to wind up in the Virginia Supreme Court).
294. See, e.g., Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119 (noting that multiple chapters of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans and other groups have already filed a lawsuit as well as a petition with the
Tennessee Historical Commission challenging Memphis’s December 2017 sale of public property with
Confederate monuments and the subsequent removal of those monuments).
295. See, e.g., Gladney, supra note 116 (discussing details of the suit filed by the State of
Alabama against the City of Birmingham after Birmingham’s decision to cover Confederate
monuments, which are more than forty years old, with plywood barriers).
296. See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text.
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the common characteristics in the history of many of the older statue
statutes297—and these efforts will likely accelerate if local governments take
greater advantage of the opportunities identified in this Article.298
Second, some state legislators who wish to preserve Confederate
monuments by statute might radically revise the existing statue statutes, seeking
new justifications or new criteria for protecting monuments even if local
governments wish to alter or be rid of them. Given the many opportunities for
local action under several of the current statutes, such wide-ranging revisions
might well strengthen the protections available to Confederate monuments in
public spaces, even if the revisions involve apparent concessions to local control
or sentiment against monuments.
Third, state legislatures may take additional punitive action against cities
that successfully remove or alter Confederate monuments. Here too, the recent
experience of the Memphis monuments is instructive—recall that in addition to
modifying the Tennessee statue statute, the state legislature also cut funding for
the city’s upcoming bicentennial after the city removed Confederate monuments
while complying with the existing statute.299 Such legislative retaliation against
local government action is, of course, a much broader trend that is not confined
to disputes over Confederate monuments.300
Revisions of the statue statutes’ current flaws may pose substantial future
challenges for local governments that wish to alter or remove Confederate
monuments, and the specter of subsequent retaliation may deter local
governments from acting to remove monuments under the letter of existing
statue statutes. But the most significant potential problem facing local
governments that wish to exploit the opportunities for action identified in
Section II does not depend on any alteration to the existing statutes. Instead, it
arises from the nature of the relationship between state and local governments.
This relationship is one of profound inequality: Cities are constitutionally and
legislatively subordinate to their states, making them vulnerable to action by
state governments.301 Traditionally, local governments have been understood as
mere “agent[s],” “creature[s],” and “delegate[s]” of the state,302 and in times of
conflict between local and state governments, the supremacy of state over local
authority often has been defined in particularly extravagant terms.303 This means
297. For example, as noted in Section II, Virginia’s statue statute has been amended at least ten
times in its century-plus existence. See supra notes 132–140.
298. See, for example, supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
unsuccessful attempts by Virginia legislators to fix the temporal gap in Virginia’s statue statute’s
coverage.
299. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, ACSBLOG (June 14, 2018),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-attack-on-american-cities [http://perma.cc/S8K7-63JZ] (noting that
Tennessee’s retaliation against Memphis is just one example of a larger trend of “[l]egislative
retaliation against progressive cities”).
301. See Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade, supra note 41, at 60–61.
302. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
303. E.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062 n.9 (1980)
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that intrastate preemption—the notion that a city’s authority in a particular area
has been supplanted by state law—looms large in the background of any
litigation about what local governments might do in the face of state law
limitations.
As Section II shows, the statue statutes are badly drafted, even if one
accepts their underlying purpose as legitimate: if put to the test in their current
form, many may fail to provide the protections they purport to provide. Indeed,
some of the statutes have already failed this test.304 Setting aside the troubling
intent behind the statue statutes, one might hope that their sloppy execution
would deter courts from the sort of aggressive judicial intervention that will
probably be required to patch some of the gaps in coverage identified in Section
II of this Article.
Unfortunately, courts in recent years have been increasingly willing to
entertain sweeping preemption arguments related to many other types of badly
drafted state legislation that has little in common with the statue statutes besides
a high degree of hostility to local control and often to specific local
governments.305 This phenomenon is twofold: state legislatures increasingly pass
legislation that strips away or dramatically limits local government control, and
state courts increasingly indulge these legislatures through an expansive
approach to intrastate preemption.306
The specter of intrastate preemption is not unique to Confederate
monuments or statue statutes.307 Indeed, litigation involving intrastate
preemption has grown increasingly common in recent years, especially in states
with a sharp political divide between liberal urban centers and conservative rural
expanses. In recent years, many states have seen their legislative and executive
branches pass under the same party’s control,308 even as local governments have
sought out new ways to regulate personal and economic conduct, including
smoking bans, antidiscrimination ordinances,309 public broadband services, and
minimum wage codes.310 More generally, the nation’s growing rural-urban divide

(discussing “the leading case” concerning “state control over city powers and city property,” Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)).
304. See, for example, supra note 256 and accompanying text for examples of situations where
the Kentucky statue statute failed to protect prominent monuments in Louisville and Lexington.
305. See, e.g., Schragger, American Cities, supra note 33, at 1165–66 (noting several recent
hostile legislative actions taken by states toward cities and local governments).
306. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007) (noting that
“intrastate preemption” has become “the primary threat” to “cities’ ability to innovate”).
307. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2366 (2003)
(suggesting that intrastate preemption will remain a “problematic shadow” until states amend their
statutes or constitutions to “instruct courts to construe narrowly the scope of state preemption of local
actions”); Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 268–70 (2000) (concluding that both express and implied preemption
are invoked to foreclose and invalidate local environmental controls).
308. NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 1–5 (2017).
309. Diller, supra note 306, at 1114–15.
310. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 308, at 6–7, 17–19.
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continually raises the question of when local governments should be able to
make their own decisions while creating clashes in which local governments are
barred from taking actions important to local residents.311
In particular, intrastate preemption conflicts have grown particularly heated
in many of the southern states with statue statutes examined in this Article.312 In
some of these states, local governments are particularly weak because they are
among a relatively small number of jurisdictions that continue to adhere to
Dillon’s Rule,313 an approach to local government distinct from the increased
autonomy of the home rule approach.314 Under Dillon’s Rule, any exercise of
local government power must “trace[] back to a specific legislative grant.”315 But
the longstanding affinity of many courts in southern states, including those with
statue statutes, for interpreting local authority narrowly and applying intrastate
preemption broadly is noteworthy in both Dillon’s Rule and home rule
jurisdictions.316
All of this means that the threat of intrastate preemption in the context of
state statue statutes is not merely a theoretical or hypothetical concern for local
governments. Although there has been little litigation related to the
opportunities for local action identified in Section II of this Article, preemption
has already emerged as a central issue in conflicts over local attempts to exploit
these opportunities. For example, in the litigation between the City of
Birmingham and the State of Alabama over the city’s Confederate monuments,
Alabama has suggested that the state statue statute’s preemption of local control
over Confederate monuments is akin to the state’s licensure of barbers and
mortgage brokers, or the taxation of aviation fuel.317
As noted above, intrastate preemption doctrine is far from uniform. When
state courts have construed and attempted to formalize the role and authority
that local governments enjoy, they have done so in a variety of ways. Among
other factors, different state legal cultures and idiosyncratic relationships
between individual cities and their larger states mean that each state has its own

311. Graham, supra note 45; see also Schragger, American Cities, supra note 33, at 1164–65,
1184–1216 (arguing that the recent “explosion of preemptive legislation challenging and overriding”
local controls is attributable, in part, to a deep-seated anti-urbanism inherent in American federalism).
312. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 45 (“Like many recent [intrastate] preemption laws passed in
states across the country, but especially in Southern states . . . , [the state statue statutes] pit
conservative state legislatures against cities that tend to be more liberal and more diverse.”).
313. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868) (Dillon, J.).
314. Diller, supra note 306, at 1124–27 (discussing the emergence of the home rule approach).
315. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade, supra note 41, at 62–63 (citing City of Clinton,
24 Iowa at 475).
316. E.g., Frayda Bluestein, Is North Carolina a Dillon’s Rule State?, COATES’ CANONS: N.C.
LOC. GOV’T L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T (Oct. 24, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/is-north-carolina-adillons-rule-state [http://perma.cc/SFZ7-276F]. For example, North Carolina courts no longer apply
Dillon’s Rule consistently, but neither is North Carolina a home rule state. Id. Nevertheless, North
Carolina courts today frequently apply preemption rules that are at least “as strict, or perhaps even
more strict” with respect to local governments’ authority than under Dillon’s Rule. Id.
317. Complaint at 2, State v. City of Birmingham, No. 01-CV-2017-903426.00 (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed
Aug. 16, 2017) (motion to dismiss denied Oct. 16, 2017).
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legal framework for preemption.318 Moreover, even within individual
jurisdictions, courts have often applied state-specific preemption doctrines
inconsistently.319 And thus, the chief issue, if and when states argue that statue
statutes should preclude local governments from making the kinds of arguments
outlined in Section II of this Article, will likely be how broadly to construe the
withdrawals and limitations found in these statutes.320 If the express language of
the statute is ambiguous or shoddily drafted—and the latter, at least, is true of
many statue statutes—then courts may turn to the following question: Should the
restrictions on local action in the state statutes be interpreted so broadly as to
preempt even those local government actions that the statute’s structure or text
clearly seems to permit?
At first glance, this might not seem to be much of a problem for local
governments, provided that whatever actions they take to modify or remove
Confederate monuments are consistent with the relevant statue statute’s express
terms or structure. But preemption arguments have been and may continue to be
deployed by some state governments and private litigants seeking to protect
Confederate monuments even when local governments take great pains to
remove or modify monuments in ways that fit within the statue statutes’ express
language and scope along the lines identified in Section II of this Article.321 More
specifically, some state governments can be expected to push back in litigation
318. E.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV.
927, 942–47 (2015).
319. Diller, supra note 306, at 1115–16 (noting that in preemption inquiries, “courts too often
rely on unhelpful judicial tests” that are applied inconsistently, creating a confusing shadow over local
authority).
Bearing in mind these caveats, the relevant framework for preemption arguments in the context
of statue statutes is express preemption—the sort of preemption that occurs when a federal statute
explicitly withdraws or limits specified powers from states, or when a state statute explicitly withdraws
or limits powers from local governments. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226–28
(2000) (defining express preemption). Preemption in the context of statue statutes is likely to be
express rather than implied because the statue statutes expressly withdraw and limit local authority
over protected monuments. This has been true for over a century, dating back to the early
formulations of Virginia’s statue statute, which prohibited local governments (and all other persons)
from interfering with or disturbing protected monuments. See supra notes 126–130 and accompanying
text.
320. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 293, 299 (2016) (noting that express preemption “requires courts to consider the scope of such
preemption”); see also Nelson, supra note 319, at 226–27 (noting that in express preemption cases,
judges must first “decide what the [preempting] clause means”).
321. The actions taken by Birmingham, and the pains that the city took to remain within the
express language of Alabama’s statue statute, offer an instructive example. See Erin Edgemon, AG
Files Lawsuit Against Birmingham over Confederate Monument, AL.COM (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/08/ag_files_lawsuit_against_birmi.html
[http://
perma.cc/ST5J-73JU] (noting Birmingham’s efforts to comply with the express language and structure
of Alabama’s statue statute). Indeed, shortly before the lawsuit, even Alabama’s governor noted that
it was at best “unclear if the statute” applied to the monuments in dispute. Erin Edgemon, Group
Threatens To Sue Birmingham Again over Possible Confederate Monument Removal, AL.COM (Aug.
16,
2017),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/08/group_threatens_to_sue_
birming.html [http://perma.cc/EW4V-FNU7]. Yet Alabama sued Birmingham the very next day,
invoking intrastate preemption. See Complaint, supra note 317.

50

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

against local actions taken along the lines advanced in Section II, arguing for the
broadest possible interpretation of statue statutes to prohibit local actions that
are arguably inconsistent with the statutes’ muddled spirits even if they comply
with the statutes’ actual terms.322
The central idea behind this argument, which has been and will be aimed at
local governments that seek to exploit opportunities to alter or remove
monuments under the statue statutes as currently drafted, is straightforward
enough. However poorly drafted an individual statue statute might be, it was
clearly intended to curtail local authority over Confederate monuments.
Accordingly, if local officials seek to exert authority over Confederate
monuments contrary to the will of some state officials, then those actions should
be preempted as contrary to the statute’s intent, even if the text of the statute
clearly seems to permit the local government’s actions.323 On this view, almost
any attempt by a local government to comply with the terms of statue statutes
while modifying or removing monuments within their jurisdiction can be
characterized as a scheme or a sham, which violates the spirit of the statute and
should be overturned.324 Whatever one’s views may be on the merits of
Confederate monuments in public places or the statue statutes that purport to
protect them, there are good reasons to reject the expansive view of preemption
outlined above—which is already emerging in the early litigation against local
governments that have attempted to modify or move Confederate monuments.
In other contexts involving express preemption claims, courts often find that
the relevant state or federal statute indicates a clear intent to preempt local or
state action only in a portion of the potentially covered regulatory area. As
noted above, the scope of the alleged preemption is the key inquiry in such
express preemption cases.325 But the preemption arguments emerging against
local governments acting under the letter of the statue statutes preclude any
inquiry into the scope of the alleged express preemption. Instead, they threaten a
preemption unlimited in scope because it is untethered to the text of the statutes
at issue. An example of intrastate preemption in another context may illustrate
322. E.g., Complaint, supra note 317, at 4 (arguing that Birmingham’s actions were inconsistent
with both the “letter and spirit” of the Alabama state statute); see also David A. Graham, Memphis’s
Novel Strategy for Tearing Down Confederate Statues, ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/memphis-confederate-statues/548990/
[http://
perma.cc/5WZK-SDK8] (arguing that Memphis’s strategy for removing monuments, along the same
lines suggested in Section II of this Article, “raise[d] . . . uncomfortable questions” because it was
“designed to follow the letter of the [statue statute] while brazenly flouting its spirit”).
323. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 317, at 2–3 (arguing that plywood coverings violate the law
prohibiting monuments from being “relocated, removed, altered, renamed, or otherwise disturbed”).
324. See, e.g., Poe, Forrest Family, supra note 119 (quoting from the Sons of Confederate
Veterans’ petition to the Tennessee Historical Commission after Memphis’s removal of certain
statues); see also City of Memphis v. Walter Law, APD No. 04.47-148176J (Tenn. Historical Comm’n
Jan. 8, 2018) (reviewing arguments but denying the petition as moot). A request for review of the
Walter Law decision was denied. Tennessee Heritage Protection Act, TENN. DEP’T ENV’T &
CONSERVATION, http://www.tn.gov/environment/about-tdec/tennessee-historical-commission/redirect--tennessee-historical-commission/tennessee-heritage-protection-act.html
[http://perma.cc/4NV57XT5] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
325. Wiseman, supra note 320, at 299.
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this point. Recent conflicts over local controls on hydraulic fracturing for oil and
gas illustrate the problems with using preemption to paper over coverage gaps in
statutes. The conflict over the extent of intrastate preemption over local fracking
controls is a useful example because both fracking and statue statutes involve
local governments’ attempts to exercise control over land use and the built
environment—an area where local governments have traditionally enjoyed
broad discretion.326
Combined with advances in directional drilling, fracking has enabled
tremendous growth in the production of U.S. natural gas, even as concerns about
the side effects of fracking on the natural and human environments have led
hundreds of local governments to try to limit fracking activity or even ban
fracking outright.327 This, in turn, has led to litigation regarding the alleged
preemption of these local limitations by state law, with varying outcomes across
different jurisdictions.328 For example, many courts have been hesitant to
conclude that statutes preempting local control in a particular regulatory area
have preempted all relevant local controls without express language indicating
such a broad scope.329 Accordingly, courts have frequently allowed substantial
local restrictions on fracking activity to remain in place, including some outright
bans.330
Perhaps more importantly, some continued local control over fracking
activity has been tolerated even in states that have relatively restrictive
approaches to local government authority, where courts have struck down local
fracking bans on preemption grounds.331 Even in such jurisdictions, when courts
conclude that local control over fracking has been preempted, they often do so in
limited terms, thereby preserving the possibility for limited future local action.332
For example, local governments in these jurisdictions can amend their zoning

326. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 45 (4th ed. 2013) (“Public land
use regulation in the United States traditionally has been mainly the province of local governments.”).
327. Outka, supra note 318, at 928–35.
328. Id. at 975 (“[L]ocal governments’ legal authority over fracking remains in flux, remains a
source of uncertainty and controversy, and will likely continue to vary meaningfully state by state.”).
329. E.g., Wiseman, supra note 320, at 309. A clear example of this is seen in Wallach v. Town of
Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), in which New York courts had to confront the extent of
preemption present in the state’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 23-0303 (McKinney 2018), with respect to a town’s decision to ban fracking activity. Wallach, 16
N.E.3d at 1188. The relevant statute provided that it “shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries,” N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 23-0303.2, which the court held was “most naturally read as preempting only local laws that purport
to regulate the actual operations of oil and gas activities, [and] not zoning ordinances that [might]
restrict or [altogether] prohibit certain land uses,” Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1195–97. Accordingly, the
court concluded that it could not hold that the relevant clause “evinces a clear expression of
preemptive intent” over local zoning laws. Id. at 1203.
330. E.g., Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1203.
331. See, e.g., Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376
(W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).
332. See, e.g., id. (holding that the city’s “complete ban on fracking” was preempted by the
state’s expressly preemptive statutory scheme, while noting that the “legal issue in [the] case is very
narrow”).

52

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

ordinances to prohibit some drilling and other fracking activity near schools,
hospitals, houses of worship, and residential neighborhoods.333 Such room for
local control over land use and the built environment remains even in the face of
statutory language that is far clearer, more comprehensive in its scope, and thus
a better platform for preemption arguments than the statue statutes examined in
this Article.
The space that remains for local governments to regulate fracking activity,
even when local bans have been preempted, suggests that at least some local
actions taken under the opportunities outlined in Section II of this Article will
survive the preemption gauntlet. Stripping away a local government’s authority
to regulate the use of land and the built environment is a far different thing than
taking away its ability to set a minimum wage or expand medical leave. The
latter strikes at local governments’ ability to innovate,334 but the former strikes at
the heart of what local governments traditionally do.335 At the most basic level,
the statue statutes are fundamentally about the control of land, which has
traditionally been at the heart of local governments’ control. Indeed, many of the
monuments in question either are the property of local governments or are built
on property that belongs to local governments. In such cases, what the statue
statutes seek to control is not merely local governments’ ability to control private
property but also local governments’ ability to control their own property.336
Nevertheless, the boundaries of intrastate preemption doctrine have
expanded in unpredictable ways in recent years, which means that courts in
some—perhaps many—jurisdictions may conclude that the relevant statue
statutes preempt opportunities for local action against Confederate monuments.
Moreover, even if preemption does not rear its unpredictable head against the
opportunities for local action contemplated in Section II, it is possible that state
legislatures in some jurisdictions will revise the statue statutes to try to close off
some of these opportunities. But neither possibility should deter local
governments from challenging the statue statutes and making use of the
opportunities discussed in this Article. In fact, challenging the statue statutes
along the lines suggested in Section II might be the best way to enhance the
constitutional arguments against the statutes reviewed in Part I.B, which would
clear out the statue statutes root and branch altogether.
At this point, it is worth remembering how the statue statutes hide their
practical flaws and constitutional vulnerabilities behind their structural

333. See, e.g., John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power,
and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1026–30 (2013) (discussing Morgantown’s
response after its ban on fracking was struck down in Northeast Natural Energy).
334. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 309, at 1114–18.
335. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 326, at 45.
336. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (West 2018) (limiting protection to those
monuments that are either themselves public property or located on public property). The relationship
between public property and the statue statutes provides what may be a significant and recurring
coverage gap across several of the statue statutes discussed above. For an example related to the
Tennessee statue statute, see supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.
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complexity,337 their sweeping references to the military history of the United
States, and their frequent discussion of monuments to veterans of other
conflicts.338 It takes a substantial amount of time and energy to scrub away the
veneer, revealing the gaps in the statue statutes’ coverage, their special solicitude
for monuments to the Confederacy, and the fraught history of Confederate
monuments in public spaces. A series of coordinated and thoughtful challenges
to the statue statutes using the opportunities outlined in Section II of this
Article, whether or not the challenges are ultimately successful, has the potential
to inform the public of these flaws in a more direct way, thereby changing
perceptions and attitudes toward Confederate monuments in public places.339
In addition, a coordinated series of challenges making use of the
opportunities identified in this Article may throw the constitutional infirmities of
the statue statutes into stark relief. Recall that even some of the authors of the
constitutional arguments against statue statutes have expressed uncertainty
about the likely success of those arguments against the statutes as currently
drafted,340 in part because Confederate monuments still enjoy widespread public
support.341 But if state legislatures revise or state courts construe the existing
statue statutes in ways that foreclose any opportunity for local control over
Confederate monuments in public spaces, then this support may shift.
When statue statutes and the monuments they protect are justified
primarily by gauzy references to a selectively remembered past, it may be
difficult to appreciate the harms they have imposed on those who have long
faced institutionalized discrimination. But forcing a defense of statue statutes on
preemption grounds, even if the underlying challenge is unsuccessful, may help
reframe the debate. An expansive approach to preemption in this context reveals
that a fight over statue statutes and the monuments they protect is not really
about how we remember some distant Lost Cause, but instead about how we
exercise power and control over our built environment in the present.
Accordingly, local governments in states with statue statutes that wish to alter or
remove Confederate monuments have much to gain by exploiting the
weaknesses of the statue statutes identified in this Article. If such local
governments succeed in the short term—and there are many reasons to think
they might—then they will expose the many flaws of the statue statutes while
altering or removing at least some Confederate monuments. But even if their
efforts are thwarted on preemption grounds, local governments that challenge
statue statutes may help us all to understand what is really at stake when we

337. Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 49; see also supra notes 49–50, 105–116 and
accompanying text (discussing the complexities associated with local governments capitalizing on
perceived flaws of state statue statutes to ignite change).
338. See supra notes 128, 141, 143, 164–165, 197–198, 219–222, 235–236, 244, 257–259, 265–270
and accompanying text (gathering references to U.S. military monuments in statue statutes while
noting the centrality of protecting Confederate monuments to these statutes).
339. See supra notes 107–109 (arguing that even unsuccessful constitutional challenges to statue
statutes may change public perception of statue statutes).
340. E.g., Kovvali, supra note 82, at 83.
341. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.

54

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

consider Confederate monuments in public spaces.
CONCLUSION
Memory, especially the shared memory that public monuments help to
build, is a tricky thing. We may hope that our individual memories were given to
us “for some wise purpose,” and we may wish to build our shared memory wisely
as well—to use it, perhaps, as a “mirror in which we may discern the dim outlines
of the future,” so that we may make that future more tolerant and just.342 But the
shared memory that we construct together can also distort what came before,
obscuring what was truly brave and virtuous and casting a false light on the
errors and evils of the past.343 By seeking to preserve Confederate monuments in
places of public honor, the statue statutes represent just such a misuse of shared
memory. These statutes reinforce a one-sided monumental vision of history that
has supported recurring patterns of institutionalized racism and violence, and
they restrict the ability of local governments to redress these historical wrongs
and present the past in a more honest and accurate light.
To date, the statue statutes have escaped widespread challenges, in part
because the statutes have been described as nearly invulnerable fortresses that
local governments cannot hope to penetrate. This conventional wisdom about
statue statutes is incorrect. Local governments have more freedom to alter or
remove Confederate monuments in public places under existing statue statutes
than many have thought and reported. They should be encouraged to challenge
the statue statutes by pursuing opportunities that recur across different versions
of the statutes as well as avenues for local action that are unique to individual
statutes. When asked to resolve these challenges, courts should not bar these
opportunities for local action by adopting overly aggressive interpretations of
intrastate preemption doctrine. Nor should state legislatures seek to close off
these opportunities for local action by attempting to repair the fundamentally
flawed statue statutes. Finally, when local governments seek to act against the
statue statutes, they should do so in coordinated fashion, framing their
challenges to highlight the statutes’ constitutional vulnerability and working to
hasten the day when these statutes can be swept away altogether.

342. Frederick Douglass, Speech at the Thirty-Third Anniversary of the Jerry Rescue 2, 17
(1884) (transcript available in the Library of Congress and on file with author).
343. See id. (worrying that “we are far more likely to forget too soon, than to remember too
long, the history of the great American conflict with slavery,” thereby losing a record of “the errors
and evils of the past” as well as “the courage and the moral heroism” with which these evils were met).

